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The dualism of jus ad bellum and jus in bello is at the heart of all that is
most problematic in the moral reality of war.
—Michael Walzer1
[I]t may happen that neither of the Parties in War acts unjustly. For no
Man acts unjustly, but he who is conscious that what he does is unjust; and
this is what many are ignorant of.
—Hugo Grotius2
I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 9, 2007, a trial chamber of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL) sentenced two leaders of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), one
of the parties to Sierra Leone’s civil war.3 The Chamber had convicted them
of exceptionally brutal crimes: mutilation, amputation, hacking civilians to
death with machetes, and other sadistic killings.4 Among relevant mitigating
factors, however, it noted that the defendants had fought for “a legitimate
cause”: “to restore the democratically elected Government of President
Kabbah.” 5 It held that their sentences should therefore be mitigated
significantly, for although their conduct transgressed “acceptable limits,” they
served a “cause that is palpably just and defendable”: “facilitating the
restoration of democracy, peace and security in [Sierra Leone]”—precisely the
objective the Security Council sought to achieve by encouraging the SCSL’s
establishment.6 Furthermore, the Chamber opined, absent mitigation, militias
in future civil wars might not intervene on behalf of legitimate governments.
Their members might fear that they, too, would be judged harshly after the
conflict.7
The SCSL Appeals Chamber emphatically disagreed, noting that the
trial chamber’s adoption of just cause as a mitigating factor violated “[t]he
basic distinction and historical separation between jus ad bellum and jus in
bello,” which it accurately characterized as “a bedrock principle” of the law of
war. 8 It also stressed that “[a]llowing mitigation for a convicted person’s
1.
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 21 (1977); see also BRIAN OREND, WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 50 (2000).
2.
2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1130 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty Fund
2005) (1625) (emphasis omitted).
3.
Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Sentencing Judgement (Oct.
9, 2007).
4.
Id. ¶ 46; see also id. ¶¶ 45-48, 52-54. In particular, the Trial Chamber convicted the
defendants of violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, see, e.g., Geneva
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III], and of Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
5.
Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 83.
6.
Id. ¶¶ 86-88; see also S.C. Res. 1315, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
7.
Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Sentencing Judgement, ¶¶ 90-91. But cf. David Luban,
War Crimes: The Law of Hell, in WAR: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 266, 278 (Larry May ed.,
2008) (arguing that “stripping belligerent immunity from rebels may deter surrender and protract civil
wars”).
8.
Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 529-30 (May
28, 2008).
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political motives, even where they are considered . . . meritorious . . . .
provides implicit legitimacy to conduct that unequivocally violates the law—
the precise conduct this Special Court was established to punish.”9 In short,
for the trial chamber, mitigation based on the “just cause” for which the
defendants fought promoted the SCSL’s goals (and those of the law of war
generally); for the Appeals Chamber, it undermined them.
This case reflects, in microcosm, a pressing issue in the contemporary
law of war. After 9/11, countless scholars and statesmen have called for
changes in the jus ad bellum, the law governing resort to force, or the jus in
bello, the law governing the conduct of hostilities. 10 These invitations to
reform, whatever their merit, raise an equally vital but distinct legal issue that
has been largely neglected in recent legal scholarship: the relationship
between the traditional branches of the law of war.11 Since the U.N. Charter
introduced a positive jus ad bellum into international law, the reigning dogma
has been that reflected in the SCSL Appeals Chamber’s opinion: the jus ad
bellum and the jus in bello are, and must remain, analytically distinct. In bello
rules and principles apply equally to all combatants, whatever each
belligerent’s avowed ad bellum rationale for resorting to force: self-defense,
the restoration of democratic government, territorial conquest, or the
destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such. 12 It is
immaterial, on this view, whether the ad bellum intent of the militia leaders
indicted by the SCSL had been to restore a democratic government or to
9.
Id. ¶ 534; accord Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement,
¶ 1082 (Dec. 17, 2004) (“The unfortunate legacy of wars shows that . . . many perpetrators believe that
violations of binding international norms can be lawfully committed, because they are fighting for a ‘just
cause.’”).
10. The literature is vast. See, e.g., NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN
21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter
& William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2002); John
Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004); John B. Bellinger, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Dep’t of
State, Speech at Oxford University: Prisoners in War: Contemporary Challenges to the Geneva
Conventions (Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/rls/96687.htm. But see Jordan J.
Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of
Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1335 (2004) (arguing that the existing law of war can accommodate contemporary
warfare); see also Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L
L. 905 (2002); W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims To Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 82
(2003). For the author’s views on some of these issues, see Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist
War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443 (2007).
11. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, the eminent scholar and former judge of the International Court of
Justice, wrote a seminal article on this issue shortly after the introduction of the jus ad bellum of the
U.N. Charter. H. Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 206
(1953); see also LOTHAR KOTZSCH, THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 83-126 (1956). Christopher Greenwood treated the issue relatively more recently
in a brief essay written during the waning days of the Cold War. Christopher Greenwood, The
Relationship Between Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello, 9 REV. INT’L STUD. 221 (1983). The issue has
otherwise been largely neglected in postwar legal scholarship. For two recent exceptions, see Alexander
Orakhelashvili, Overlap and Convergence: The Interaction Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 12
J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 157 (2007); and Marco Sassòli, Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello—The
Separation Between the Legality of the Use of Force and Humanitarian Rules To Be Respected in
Warfare: Crucial or Outdated, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE
FAULTLINES 241 (Michael Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007).
12. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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topple that government and install a brutal regime in its stead: they must
adhere to and be judged by the same in bello rules and principles.
Postwar international law regards this analytic independence as
axiomatic,13 as do most just war theorists. They insist that “[i]t is perfectly
possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought
in strict accordance with the rules.”14 In theory, then, any use of force may be
simultaneously lawful and unlawful: unlawful, because its author had no right
to resort to force under the jus ad bellum; lawful, if and to the extent that its
author observes “the rules,” that is, the jus in bello. 15 I will refer to this
particular rule, which insists on the analytic independence of ad bellum and in
bello, as the dualistic axiom. Despite its widespread acceptance,16 the axiom,
as we will see, is logically questionable, 17 undertheorized, and at times
disregarded or misapplied in practice—with troubling consequences for the
policies that underwrite these components of the contemporary law of war.
Consider briefly a few examples, which, among others, will be explored in
greater detail below:
• In 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) carried out
a four-month air campaign against Serbia. At the outset, NATO’s
leaders made an in bello decision: its pilots would fly at a minimum
height of 15,000 feet to reduce their risk from anti-aircraft fire
essentially to zero, even though that would increase the risk to
Serbian civilians because it often prevented visual confirmation of
legitimate military targets. Many would argue that the in bello
principle of proportionality obliges combatants to take some risk in an
effort to reduce the risk to enemy civilians. 18 If so, the perceived
legitimacy of NATO’s avowed ad bellum goal, i.e., to halt the
incipient ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanian Kosovars, influenced
13. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 406-08
(1963); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 4-5 (2004); Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 10, § 101, at 10-11 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).
14. WALZER, supra note 1, at 21; see also LARRY MAY, WAR CRIMES AND JUST WAR 30
(2007); Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the Morality of War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 34, 35 (2005).
15. Writers often use the phrase “law of war” ambiguously to refer to either or both the jus ad
bellum and the jus in bello. IHL traditionally referred only to that part of the jus in bello that protected
those rendered hors de combat, but today it typically refers to the jus in bello generally. For convenience
and clarity, throughout this Article, I will use (1) “law of war” to refer to the entire corpus of
international law on the use of force; (2) “jus in bello,” “law of armed conflict,” and IHL
interchangeably to refer to the law governing the conduct of hostilities; and (3) “law on the use of force”
and “jus ad bellum” interchangeably to refer to the law governing resort to force.
16. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
2005 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 58); BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at
406-08; Lauterpacht, supra note 11, at 215-20.
17. See, e.g., Hurka, supra note 14, at 44-45; Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114
ETHICS 693 (2004) [hereinafter McMahan, Ethics of Killing]; Jeff McMahan, On the Moral Equality of
Combatants, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 377, 379-80 (2006) [hereinafter McMahan, Moral Equality]; see also
Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of War, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 28 (2004) (arguing that the dualistic axiom is subject to “slippery slopes,”
which its advocates’ “arguments have always been normatively and logically insufficient to prevent”).
18. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, Two Kinds of Military Responsibility, in ARGUING ABOUT
WAR 23, 23-24 (2004).
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the international ex post appraisal of NATO’s in bello conduct in the
conflict.19
• After 9/11, the Bush administration launched and prosecuted what it
described as a “Global War on Terror.” In this war, if it is a war,20
political elites and their lawyers invoked ad bellum factors—for
example, the novel nature of the conflict or the enemy and the
imperative to avoid at any cost another catastrophic terrorist attack—
to justify or excuse in bello violations.21 Both treaties and custom, for
example, categorically prohibit the in bello tactic of torture. It is
difficult to dispute that the United States deliberately tortured some
detainees in its custody. Alberto R. Gonzales also wrote in what has
become an infamous memorandum that “the war against terrorism is a
new kind of war,” which “renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations
on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its
provisions.” 22 One might recharacterize this assertion in the
framework of this Article as a suggestion that ad bellum
considerations may justifiably relax, or even vitiate, what some see as
anachronistic in bello constraints.23
• In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered the
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.24 This required it to
analyze both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. The Court
concluded that the jus in bello generally prohibits nuclear weapons—
with a curious qualification. It could not say “whether the threat or
use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State
19. See infra notes 290-314 and accompanying text.
20. See Sloane, supra note 10, at 446-47 & nn.19-21. I assume for the purposes of this Article
that some aspects of the so-called “Global War on Terror,” which I have described in earlier work as an
“imprecise, unhelpful, and often counterproductive” label, nonetheless may lawfully be (and, at times, as
a matter of policy, perhaps should be) treated within the rubric of war. See id. at 447 & n.21. This debate
would require a substantial digression, but, in short, I have argued that:
[T]he distinction between terrorism as crime and terrorism as war is not ultimately
qualitative. It is, like the question of war itself, something people decide. War has no
Platonic form. To suggest that as a matter of international law, a terrorist network by
definition cannot be a party to an armed conflict in the twenty-first century strikes me as
both inaccurate and anachronistic, although it would be equally implausible and illadvised to begin treating all or even most acts of terrorism within the rubric of war.
Id. at 447 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
21. See, e.g., Allen S. Weiner, Book Review, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 244 (2007) (reviewing
STEVEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY (2005)) (noting Neff’s emphasis
on “the just war terms in which the ‘war against terrorism’ has been couched,” as well as “that states
asserting a right to use force against terrorists have rejected the notion of any moral equivalence between
them and their adversaries”).
22. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Office of Counsel to
the President, to George W. Bush, President of the U.S. (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE
PAPERS 118, 119 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (regarding application of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War to the conflict with Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban).
23. See infra notes 341-358 and accompanying text.
24. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8).
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would be at stake.”25 Again, to recharacterize this statement in the
framework of this Article: if the ad bellum consequences for one
party to a conflict become bad enough, a weapon otherwise
categorically prohibited by the jus in bello might become legal for
that party, although presumably it would remain illegal for the
other—unless that other party, too, “a State,” faced an “extreme
circumstance of self-defence.”
The logic in each of these examples is contrary to the dualistic axiom,
which insists that in bello constraints apply equally to all parties to a conflict.
They do not vary based on ad bellum appraisals of the justice, legitimacy, or
even urgency of one side’s asserted casus belli (cause or justification for
resort to force). 26 Yet these examples reflect a trend in contemporary
international law to relax or disregard the dualistic axiom, that is, to allow ad
bellum considerations to influence and, at times, even to vitiate the jus in
bello—an outcome that degrades the efficacy of both components of the law
of war. Recent state practice and some jurisprudence also suggest a related,
and equally misguided, tendency to collapse the distinct ad bellum and in
bello proportionality constraints imposed by the law of war. As explained in
greater detail below, today, in contrast to the pre-U.N. Charter era, all force
must be doubly proportionate: that is, proportionate relative to both the jus ad
bellum and the jus in bello.27 Yet, at times, the ICJ has confused, neglected, or
misapplied the two principles, as have belligerents—again to the detriment of
the key values and policies that underwrite the contemporary law of war.
Briefly, ad bellum proportionality asks whether the initial resort to force
or particular quantum of force used is proportional to the asserted casus
belli.28 So were one state to invade another in response to, say, an isolated
naval incident that damaged one of its warships but caused no casualties, that
would be ad bellum disproportionate.29 In contrast, were that warship to return
fire in self-defense, or in an effort to deter comparable future strikes, that
might well be ad bellum proportionate. But in contemporary international law,
the analysis should not end there. The reciprocal strike must also be in bello
proportionate, which is a distinct issue. Now the casus belli drops out of the
analysis. In bello proportionality tries to limit needless suffering in war
regardless of the ad bellum legitimacy (including ad bellum proportionality)
of each party’s resort to force. It asks whether each particular strike will cause

25. Id. at 266.
26. See infra notes 377-384 and accompanying text.
27. JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 1011 (2004); Greenwood, supra note 11, at 223; see also infra notes 135-153 and accompanying text.
28. Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 113, 132 (1986) (“[A]cts done in self-defense must not exceed in manner or aim the necessity
provoking them.”); see also id. at 120 (“Self-defense must not only be necessary but also proportional to
the offense in its extent, manner, and goal.”).
29. See Oscar Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 HOUS.
J. INT’L L. 309, 315 (1989) (describing as grossly disproportionate “the destruction of a city because of a
single terrorist incident”).
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civilian harm that “would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.”30
The disconnect between international law’s nominal commitment to the
dualistic axiom and its corollaries, on the one hand, and the frequent elision or
misconstruction of those principles in practice, on the other, is often not (as
some may be inclined to think) a mere product of bad faith or of Cicero’s
maxim inter arma silent leges (amid the arms of war, the laws are silent). It
also reflects the dualistic axiom’s somewhat paradoxical nature and a failure
to appreciate its true rationale and practical limits. The end of the Cold War
and twenty-first-century developments in the nature and law of war—
including, for example, the advent of modern transnational terrorist networks,
the increasing availability of catastrophic weapons to nonstate actors,31 and
the “humanization” of international humanitarian law (IHL) 32 —invite a
reappraisal of the ad bellum-in bello relationship: what is it, and what should
it be?
This Article ventures answers to these questions. Given the complexity
of the field, however, its real aspiration is more modest: to bring these
questions back into the vigorous contemporary dialogue about the future
shape of the law of war. For they have been conspicuously—and, I think,
dangerously—absent from that dialogue. While I defend the dualistic axiom
against what I see as its often tacit and subtle erosion, I also try to refine and
clarify it so that it better serves the policies that underwrite it: minimizing
unauthorized coercion and reducing superfluous suffering in war. Two forms
of analytic conflation, in particular, afflict the modern law of war: (1) at the
macro level, conflation of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello generally, i.e.,
a failure to apply the dualistic axiom properly or at all; and (2) at the micro
level, conflation of the distinct proportionality constraints imposed by each
body of law. Both forms of conflation compromise the law’s efficacy relative
to the evolving nature of twenty-first-century hostilities. The dualistic axiom
remains indispensable to the law of war. But it cannot be applied
acontextually—for example, without considering, descriptively, the
comparative power of the parties, the technology available to each, and the
nature of the conflict.
Furthermore, often, and particularly in the context of “supreme
emergency” arguments,33 conflation may be ascribed in part to a failure to
appreciate that ad bellum and in bello constraints on war presuppose distinct
units of value, which correspond roughly to the quintessential distinction
between classical and contemporary international law: the ad bellum operates
principally at the level of polities (often, but not always today, states); the in
30. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 57(2)(a)(iii), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
31. See GORDON CORERA, SHOPPING FOR BOMBS: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, GLOBAL
INSECURITY, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE A.Q. KHAN NETWORK 161-64 (2006); MOISÉS NAÍM,
ILLICIT: HOW SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 38-64
(2005).
32. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 241
(2000).
33. See infra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
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bello operates principally at the level of individuals. While states and other
polities may sometimes possess an “associative” value beyond the
“aggregative” value constituted by the sum of the interests of their
constituents,34 they should not be romanticized.35 I take for granted a premise
of liberal political theory: that only human beings, not abstractions like states,
merit foundational moral weight. That need not prevent ascribing value to
collectives insofar as they genuinely represent and serve their constituents,36
but “any rights states have must derive from and concern their citizens.”37 The
significance of this moral postulate will become clear in the course of the
argument.
At the outset, however, I should say that it means that fascist, Marxist,
and like polities, which ascribe value to collectives qua collectives, will not
find some of the following arguments persuasive. It is no coincidence, for
example, that the Soviet Union and North Vietnam argued that the victims of
aggression need not abide by IHL.38 Yet I doubt that polities of this sort would
in any event have social, political, or moral (as opposed to solely
instrumentalist) reasons to conform their initiation and conduct of war to
international law. Henkin has famously argued that most international law
“does not address itself principally to ‘criminal elements’ on the one hand or
to ‘saints’ on the other. . . . The law is aimed principally at the mass in
between—at those who, while generally law-abiding, might yet be tempted to
some violations by immediate self-interest.” 39 To guide and regulate their
initiation and conduct of war is the most that the international law of war, too,
may hope to accomplish. It would be quixotic to suppose otherwise. But the
point of emphasis is that insofar as the dualistic axiom compels our respect
today, it is because of postwar international law’s solicitude for the individual
as the fundamental unit of value—a feature shared by IHL and international
human rights law. 40 Human rights, not the rights of states or other
abstractions, underwrite the dualistic axiom.
Given this postulate, contemporary international law must candidly
acknowledge consequences of the dualistic axiom that it has tended to elide to
date. First, it must recognize that, descriptively, discretionary in bello
judgments—in particular, about in bello proportionality—at times vary
depending on oft-politicized characterizations of the perceived justice or
legality of conflicts. That is, they vary, contrary to the dualistic axiom, based
34. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract, in THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS
141, 147-49 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1987) (1762); see also Michael Walzer, The
Moral Standing of States, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 217 (Charles R. Beitz et al. eds., 1985).
35. See David Luban, The Romance of the Nation-State, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, supra
note 34, at 238 [hereinafter Luban, Romance of the Nation-State]; David Luban, Just War and Human
Rights, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, supra note 34, at 208-09 [hereinafter Luban, Just War and Human
Rights] (“States—patriots and Rousseau to the contrary—are not to be loved, and seldom to be
trusted.”). But see Walzer, supra note 34; Michael Walzer, The Rights of Political Communities, in
INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, supra note 34.
36. See generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP (1995).
37. Hurka, supra note 14, at 51.
38. See Sassòli, supra note 11, at 247.
39. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 94 (2d ed. 1979).
40. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2-10 (1990); Luban, Just War and Human
Rights, supra note 35; see also W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 872 (1990).
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on ad bellum judgments. That does not mean that they should. But they do.
Despite nominal consensus on the dualistic axiom, international law tends to
tolerate more incidental civilian harm (“collateral damage”) if the alleged
casus belli is either (1) widely perceived as legal (for example, a clear and
unassailable case of self-defense) or (2) formally illegal but still perceived as
legitimate, meaning that it furthers broadly shared international values:
preserving minimum order, halting human rights atrocities, and so forth. This
may explain, in part, why many accepted NATO’s in bello decision to fight a
zero-casualty aerial war against Serbia to forestall incipient ethnic cleansing
rather than insist that it take precautions that could have better enabled
NATO’s fighter pilots to reduce Serbian civilian casualties—but at the price
of some risk to NATO’s soldiers.
Second, international law must recognize and respond to the force of
recent theoretical objections to the dualistic axiom, which suggest that the
answer to the in bello question “proportional to what?” logically depends on
an ad bellum judgment about the justice or legality of the conflict. Some
modern theorists argue that the “military advantage anticipated,”41 to which
any collateral damage must be in bello proportionate, cannot be hermetically
divorced from the goods that justify force. Hurka writes, for example, “[i]f
‘military advantage’ justifies killing civilians, it does so only because of the
further goods such advantage will lead to, and how much it justifies depends
on what those goods are.”42 This implies that in bello judgments not only do
(descriptively) but also must (logically or normatively) depend, at some level
of abstraction, on precisely the sort of ad bellum judgment that the dualistic
axiom insists we exclude.
While the objection is not unassailable even in strict theoretical terms,43
to adapt Justice Holmes’s maxim, the life of the law of war “has not been
logic: it has been experience.”44 Even were the dualistic axiom not strictly
defensible in normative or ethical terms, as a legal convention, it remains
grounded in experience and an appreciation of the political and moral reality
of war. Respect for the axiom remains indispensable to IHL in practice and
almost always serves the goals and values that underwrite it. But those goals
and values sometimes prove to be in tension with one another. They cannot be
reduced to a simple formula or justified by a single moral theory; rather, they
instantiate a complex blend of deontology, teleology, and virtue ethics.
Military strategists and political elites will, as they already have, increasingly
confront consequent tensions in IHL, which must be candidly confronted, not
elided: for example, whether torture, currently prohibited categorically, may
ever be justified or excused based on a consequentialist analysis; or whether
the imperative to stop a genocide may ever partially relax the in bello
proportionality constraint.
41.
42.

Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
Hurka, supra note 14, at 45; see also McMahan, Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 714-

15.
43. See, e.g., Yitzhak Benbaji, A Defense of the Traditional War Convention, 118 ETHICS 464,
466 (2008) (arguing, inter alia, that critiques of the traditional war convention mistakenly presuppose a
Hobbesian rather than Lockean conception of the scope of the right of self-defense).
44. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap
Press 1963) (1881).
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Part II traces the evolution of the dualistic axiom. It did not take hold
until comparatively late in the history of warfare and remains surprisingly
tenuous. Part III explains the sources and logic of conflation: how and why the
axiom may be neglected, misconstrued, or misapplied, degrading the efficacy
of both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. Part IV then shows how
conflation infects some international jurisprudence on, and the practice of,
war. It demonstrates the cost of conflation in terms of the law’s ability to
coherently promote two paramount policies of contemporary international
law: minimizing unauthorized coercion and reducing needless suffering. The
Article concludes by summarizing how geostrategic changes, war’s evolution,
and technological advances increasingly challenge the dualistic axiom—and
by trying to clarify the axiom to strengthen its ability to resist those
developments. In particular, it stresses the need to operationalize and make
concrete both ad bellum and in bello regulatory strategies in a way that
belligerents, at least those operating in good faith, may be incentivized to
adhere to and to regard as feasible in the circumstances of modern war.
Ultimately, the efficacy and normative force of the international law of
war is roughly commensurate to its correspondence to the nature and felt
necessities of warfare. Insofar as conflation obscures the need to refine the
law of war to adapt to current sociopolitical conditions and to work out
practicable conceptions of both ad bellum and in bello proportionality, it
impedes the ability of international law to develop incrementally at both ends
of the duality. And insofar as the highly diverse participants in modern
warfare see a growing disconnect between the law and moral reality of war,
the law may well cease, to that extent, to operate as effectively as it otherwise
could to serve the policies that underwrite it.
II.

THE HISTORY OF AN AXIOM: INDEPENDENCE OR INTERDEPENDENCE?

International lawyers and just war theorists alike use the Latin phrases
jus ad bellum and jus in bello to describe, respectively, the law governing
resort to force and the law governing the conduct of hostilities. It would be
inaccurate to distinguish sharply between the historical evolution of these two
traditions, which overlap and continue to influence each other. But they
neither can nor should be equated. 45 Just war theory is much older than
international law. It originated and evolved principally in theological and
ethical, not legal, terms.46 The law of war developed largely in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. While influenced by just war doctrine, it reflects
humanist, positivist, and political realist responses to the trauma of modern
war. That is why the U.N. Charter does not speak of just and unjust wars but
only of the “scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold
sorrow to mankind.”47 Both mainstream just war theory and international law,
however, embrace the dualistic axiom and, in both intellectual traditions, this
is a surprisingly recent innovation.
45. See McMahan, Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 730.
46. WILLIAM V. O’BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 13 (1981); Josef L.
Kunz, Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 528, 529-30 (1951).
47. U.N. Charter pmbl.
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Evolution of the Dualistic Axiom in Just War Theory
1.

Ancient and Medieval Origins: Interdependence

The Western concept of bellum justum (just war) originated in the early
Roman era,48 at which time it had principally a procedural meaning: a war
“preceded by a solemn action taken by the collegium fetialium, a corporation
of special priests, the fetiales,” who would certify to the senate under oath that
“a foreign nation had violated its duty toward the Romans” and thereby
created a just cause for war.49 Roman law did not include a distinct jus in
bello. 50 Within ad bellum limits, wars were “essentially unrestrained.
Prisoners could be enslaved or massacred; plunder was general; and no
distinction was recognized between combatants and noncombatants.”51 Hence
theologians would later refer to ethically unregulated warfare, which
justifiably could be waged against infidels, as bellum Romanum.
Yet Augustine, the progenitor of theological just war doctrine, likewise
said almost nothing about in bello issues.52 He integrated Christian virtues of
patience and pacificism with the inherited just war theory of ancient Rome,53
yielding a substantive conception of just war in contrast to the largely
procedural one of Roman law.54 But insofar as he spoke to issues that might
today fall within the jus in bello rubric, his admonitions were not independent
of, but intertwined with, the jus ad bellum. In Augustine’s view, only God’s
clear command (as depicted, for example, in the Israelite wars of the Old
Testament) could offer reliable assurance of the just nature of a war.
Consequently, constraints on the conduct of hostilities were simply the
48. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 63 (4th ed. 2005). Jus ad
bellum antecedents exist in the writings of classical Greece, the Hebrew Bible, and elsewhere, but until
ancient Rome, none of these can be described accurately as an ethical concept, still less a legal one, of
bellum justum. See BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 3-4; ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS 9-11, 15 (1947) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY]; G.I.A.D. Draper,
Grotius’ Place in the Development of Legal Ideas About War, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 177, 177 (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts eds., 1990); Arthur Nussbaum,
Just War—A Legal Concept?, 42 MICH. L. REV. 453, 453-54 (1943) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Just War].
49. Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 454; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 4;
Draper, supra note 48, at 178-79; Joachim von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in
International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 665, 666 (1939).
50. In bello, like ad bellum, antecedents can be found throughout ancient civilizations. See
Deuteronomy 20:10-20; L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 20-23 (2d ed.
2001); THE LAW CODE OF MANU 113 (Patrick Olivelle ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2004);
NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 15; SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 26 (Cheng Lin trans.,
Confucius Publishing Co. 1970) (ca. 510 B.C.); Josiah Ober, Classical Greek Times, in THE LAWS OF
WAR 12 (Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos & Mark R. Shulman eds., 1994); Surya P. Subedi,
The Concept in Hinduism of ‘Just War’, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 339, 354-57 (2003).
51. Robert C. Stacey, The Age of Chivalry, in THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 50, at 27, 27.
The same concept prevailed in classical Greek thought: restraints against, for example, enslavement, did
not apply in wars against (non-Greek) “barbarians.” See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC § 469(b)-(c), at 144
(C.D.C. Reeve ed., G.M.A. Grube trans., 1992) (ca. 380 B.C.).
52. JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR 123 (1981);
Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 391, 395 &
n.23 (1993).
53. See FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 16 (1975); see also
Draper, supra note 48, at 180; Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 455.
54. See von Elbe, supra note 49, at 668; see also RUSSELL, supra note 53, at 16-39; Kunz,
supra note 46, at 530.
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“inevitable consequences of lack of absolute certainty such as God alone can
give.”55 Augustine did, however, preach mercy, and he recognized, if only as
a prudential matter, that wars fought without it could endanger the stability of
any future peace—the ultimate goal, in his view, of any war.56
Aquinas, the principal medieval scholastic who systematically codified
and expanded Augustinian just war doctrine, 57 likewise did not develop a
distinct jus in bello. Although he condemned the deliberate slaughter of
noncombatants,58 this and other scattered theological antecedents did not add
up to a coherent conception of jus in bello as a set of legal or ethical
injunctions. 59 Again, insofar as a theological analogue to the jus in bello
existed,60 it remained parasitic on the jus ad bellum. Hence, for Aquinas, too,
“the justness of the resort to war determined to a large extent the limits on the
conduct of war; that is, the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello were
interdependent.”61 In general, in the theological, as in the Roman, tradition, a
just cause authorized any means of war, however brutal. 62 Conversely,
soldiers who fought in unjust wars were, for that reason alone, deemed
criminals—even if they refrained from atrocities such as plunder, rape, and
massacre.63
Restraints on the conduct of hostilities chiefly evolved as a part of
chivalry, a largely secular tradition. 64 As the means of warfare grew more
sophisticated in the Middle Ages, medieval war ordinances and customary
codes evolved for knights inter se, 65 which, although often violated in
practice, presaged the later emergence of a distinct jus in bello.66 Yet restraints
55. JOHNSON, supra note 52, at xxx.
56. AUGUSTINE, POLITICAL WRITINGS 3-12 (Ernest L. Fortin & Douglas Kries eds., Michael
W. Tkacz & Douglas Kries trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1994) (ca. 410 A.D.); see also NUSSBAUM,
CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 41.
57. See Draper, supra note 48, at 181; James Turner Johnson, The Just War Idea: The State of
the Question, 23 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 167, 177 (2006); Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 456-57.
Alexander of Hales, Gratian, and other theologians who contributed to the evolution of Christian just
war theory, see BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 6 & n.4; von Elbe, supra note 49, at 669-70, likewise did
not develop a distinct jus in bello, see Stacey, supra note 51, at 30-31.
58. John Finnis, The Ethics of War and Peace in the Catholic Natural Law Tradition, in THE
ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 26 (Terry Nardin ed., 1996); see also NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY, supra
note 48, at 44.
59. See Stacey, supra note 51, at 30-31; see also JOHNSON, supra note 52, at 124-50;
MAURICE H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 189-90 (1965).
60. Strictly, according to James Turner Johnson, “it is incorrect to speak of classical just war
before 1500.” Before that time, “there exist[ed] two doctrines, a religious (i.e., theological and
canonical) one largely limited to the right to make war (jus ad bellum) and a secular one whose almost
total content related to the proper mode of fighting (Law of Arms, jus in bello).” JAMES TURNER
JOHNSON, IDEOLOGY, REASON, AND THE LIMITATION OF WAR 8 (1975).
61. Gardam, supra note 52, at 395; see also Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War and the
Law of War, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 366 (1953).
62. See Gardam, supra note 52, at 395. Moreover, “just war could legitimize criminal acts and
create a legal title to goods whose taking in other circumstances would be considered robbery.”
THEODOR MERON, Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth and the Laws of War, in WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF
AGE 11, 22 (1998); see also Draper, supra note 48, at 182.
63. Leon Friedman, Introduction to 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3, 10-11
(Leon Friedman ed., 1972); cf. Draper, supra note 48, at 182-83.
64. See GREEN, supra note 50, at 23-25; Stacey, supra note 51, at 30-38.
65. See THEODOR MERON, Medieval and Renaissance Ordinances of War: Codifying
Discipline and Humanity, in WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE, supra note 62, at 1.
66. Draper, supra note 48, at 185; see also Michael Howard, Temperamenta Belli: Can War
Be Controlled?, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR 5 (Michael Howard ed., 1979). By the end of the Middle Ages,
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on war applied only to Christian knights67 (hence the extraordinary brutality
of the Crusades), and the ad bellum criterion of “public authority” continued
to determine rights and privileges in war, for example, to collect ransom or
seize booty. 68 In short, the incipient jus in bello remained bound up with
highly particularistic conceptions about the propriety of both the warrior and
the war. The idea that the jus in bello should apply equally to belligerents
remained largely foreign to medieval thought, secular and religious alike. In
fact, the jus ad bellum largely determined the jus in bello, insofar as the latter
existed.
2.

The Scholastics: Can a War Be Just on Both Sides?

Not coincidentally, the dualistic axiom’s origins roughly coincide with
the emergence of international law in the decades surrounding the Peace of
Westphalia. The problem that led to its evolution is a familiar one that persists
today: invariably, each party to war claims the mantle of justice for itself and
denies it to the other.69 In the emergent era of decentralized authority, with
power dispersed among multiple sovereigns—as opposed to the previous
(notionally) uniform authority of the Holy Roman Empire and the Pope—no
single sovereign could be the arbiter of the justice of conflicts among them.70
Consequently, even before Grotius, who often receives principal credit for
developing the dualistic axiom, 71 thinkers such as Francisco de Vitoria,
Francisco Suárez, and Alberico Gentili began to elaborate justifications for the
equal application of the jus in bello to just and unjust belligerents alike.72
Vitoria, for example, whose views largely reflect those of the later
scholastics, explicitly distinguished the categories of jus ad bellum and jus in
bello for the first time,73 a precondition of the dualistic axiom. He denied that
any war could be objectively “just on both sides,” where objective means “in
the sight of God.” 74 But he recognized that because of human ignorance,
mistake, or uncertainty about the divine will (a problem raised by Augustine a
millennium before), all belligerents would often believe, in good faith, in the
justice of their casus belli. Situations would therefore arise in which a “war
may be just in itself for the side which has true justice on its side, and also
[apparently] just for the other side, because they wage war in good faith and
[t]he jus in bello included two major elements: a listing of classes of persons who
normally, by reason of their personal characteristics . . . or social function, were to be
regarded as noncombatants and not to be directly, intentionally attacked during a just
war; and some rather moribund efforts to define certain means of war as impermissible
because of their inherently indiscriminate or disproportionate effects.
Johnson, supra note 57, at 169.
67. JOHNSON, supra note 52, at xxiii, 128-29; see also Draper, supra note 48, at 184-85;
Stacey, supra note 51, at 28, 30, 33.
68. Stacey, supra note 51, at 31-32; see also KEEN, supra note 59, at 137-85.
69. Gardam, supra note 52, at 392-94.
70. See DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 66 (4th ed. 2005); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at
11.
71. Gardam, supra note 52, at 396 & n.29.
72. E.g., THEODOR MERON, Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius, and Suárez, in
WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE, supra note 62, at 122.
73. JOHNSON, supra note 52, at 175.
74. JOHNSON, supra note 60, at 194.
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are hence excused from sin.”75 In short, epistemic uncertainty about God’s
will supplied the initial rationale for the dualistic axiom.
3.

Natural Law: The Birth of Secular Just War Doctrine

Until Gentili, however, who receives general credit for “ridding
international law of the shackles of theology,”76 the dualistic axiom lacked a
real secular foundation. Against the scholastic view, Gentili argued from a
natural law perspective that war could be objectively just on both sides (not
only apparently so because of one belligerent’s mistake). 77 He also
reconceptualized noncombatant immunity. Rather than base it on the supposed
innocence of certain classes relative to war’s causes, he stressed humanitarian
ideals that more closely approximate those of modern IHL78 and drew “a clear
line of demarcation between the legal aspects of the war problem on the one
hand, [and] theology and ethics on the other.”79
Grotius brought these disparate strands of thought together in his
magisterial work De Jure Belli ac Pacis. First, echoing the scholastics (and,
for that matter, the Socratic view that man does evil only because of
ignorance), he argued that while, in principle, “[w]ar cannot be just on both
Sides, . . . because the very Nature of the Thing does not permit one to have a
moral Power, or true Right, to two contrary Things, as suppose to do a Thing,
and to hinder the doing of it,” still, “it may happen that neither of the Parties
in War acts unjustly. For no man acts unjustly, but he who is conscious that
what he does is unjust; and this is what many are ignorant of.” 80 Second,
echoing Gentili, he argued from a secular (natural law) rather than a
theological perspective that certain restraints should apply equally to all
combatants.81 These included the ethical admonition that noncombatants (for
example, women, children, the elderly, farmers, clergy, and merchants), as
75. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS 312-13 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy
Lawrance eds., 1991) (emphasis omitted); see also JOHNSON, supra note 60, at 155; Nussbaum, Just
War, supra note 48, at 460. Suárez elaborated similar views. He rejected the idea of excusable ignorance
but recommended that, should both belligerents claim to be fighting justly, they submit to arbitration.
See 2 FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, On War (Disp. XIII), in SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS 815-16 (James
Brown Scott ed., Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi Brown & John Waldron trans., Clarendon Press 1944)
(1621); see also JOHNSON, supra note 60, at 194; NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 69.
76. NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 79; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at
11; Draper, supra note 48, at 190.
77. 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRE TRES [THE THREE BOOKS ON THE LAW OF
WAR] 31-32 (James Brown Scott ed., John C. Rolfe trans., Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace 1933)
(1612); see RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 31 (1999). Gentili also recognized
gradations of justice in war: at times, “war is just on one side, but on the other is still more just.” 2
GENTILI, supra, at 33. In the context of the post-9/11 preoccupation with preventive (or preemptive) war,
animated substantially by the 2002 National Security Strategy and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which is
widely (though incorrectly) believed to have been justified on that basis, it is worth mentioning one
reason for Gentili’s belief that a war could be just on both sides: in cases of preventive war, where two
sides threatened each other, Gentili believed that each might be justified in striking first. The other could
then justifiably respond in defense. I am grateful to David Luban for calling my attention to this point.
78. See Draper, supra note 48, at 190.
79. Von Elbe, supra note 49, at 677.
80. 2 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 1130; see also id. at 1131.
81. E.g., 3 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 1420-21; see also JOHNSON, supra note 52, at 178-79;
G.I.A.D. Draper, The Development of International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 67, 67 (1988).
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well as combatants who requested quarter, be spared unless found guilty of a
crime.82
It is in this latter regard that Grotius’s strongest contribution to modern
IHL emerges. He elaborated the idea of temperamenta belli, moderation in
war, to which the third book of his treatise is largely devoted. Far more than
his predecessors, he stressed humanitarian constraints on war—even if in
moral, not strictly legal, terms,83 for Grotius regarded international law, such
as it existed then, as permissive in this respect. 84 Yet by looking to state
practice for evidence of natural law, which he found in man’s social nature
rather than the divine will,85 he facilitated a critical transition from theological
just war theory (expounded mainly by the scholastics) to what would,
centuries later, be reformulated as IHL (expounded mainly by international
lawyers, statesmen, and secular humanists).86
4.

Positivism: Just War as Positive Morality

Yet if Grotius and Gentili marked the birth of secular just war theory and
an early entreaty for the dualistic axiom, their work also reflected the new
paradigm of the law of nations, which culminated in its virtually simultaneous
demise. Divorced from religious foundations and transposed to a world of
states competing for power and influence, just war doctrine rapidly
degenerated into what John Austin would deride as “positive morality.”87 The
view of Gentili and Grotius—that a war could be just for both belligerents—
ironically “brought the just war doctrine in international law to a cul-desac.”88 For states invariably justified resort to hostilities in just war terms, but
no neutral arbiter, even in theory, existed, rendering the doctrine even more
manipulable and almost entirely ineffective as restraint on the use of war as
tool of statecraft.89
Positivism, which gradually displaced natural law as the reigning
methodology of international law, therefore explicitly relegated just war
doctrine to the domain of ethics rather than law. 90 Hence, in his highly
82. See 3 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 1439-51.
83. NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 106-07. The distinction between the two
was not, at the time, anywhere near as sharp as in contemporary legal positivism, however.
84. See Draper, supra note 48, at 198.
85. Because Grotius “proceeded on the assumption that the practices of contemporary states
were not improper deviations from a theological norm, but expressions of a natural order whose
principles he could determine,” Friedman, supra note 63, at 15, he “claimed in earnest that the law of
nature and international law derived therefrom could subsist without a divine foundation.” Nussbaum,
Just War, supra note 48, at 466. Furthermore, “by taking a pragmatic, positivistic approach, Grotius
could reach both the Catholic princes and the Protestant rulers then engaged in the bitter battles of the
Thirty Years War (1618-1648).” Friedman, supra note 63, at 15; see also Hedley Bull, The Importance
of Grotius, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 48, at 65, 78.
86. See Draper, supra note 81, at 67-68.
87. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 19-20 (Wilfrid E. Rumble
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832); see also Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 469-71.
88. DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 66-67.
89. See id.; see also MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 134 (1961) (“The absence of an effective central authority enabled each
belligerent to be, in effect, his own and final judge . . . .”).
90. Von Elbe, supra note 49, at 682 (quoting EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 380
(Edward D. Ingram ed., Joseph Chitty trans., 1857) (1758)).
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influential treatise The Law of Nations, Emer de Vattel begins his analysis of
war by stressing “the necessary law of nations, or of the law of nature”91 and,
by reference to it, denouncing unjust wars.92 But after characterizing natural
law as “the inviolable rule that each [nation] ought conscientiously to
follow,” 93 Vattel explains why, as Nussbaum would later write, just war
doctrine “fades entirely as soon as it is severed from its fostering soil,
religion”94:
But in the contests of nations and sovereigns who live together in a state of nature, how
can this rule [that “[h]e alone whom justice and necessity have armed, has a right to make
war”] be enforced? They acknowledge no superior. Who then shall be judge between
them, to assign to each his rights and obligations—to say to the one, “You have a right to
take up arms, to attack your enemy, and subdue him by force,”—and to the other, “Every
act of hostility that you commit will be an act of injustice; your victories will be so many
murders, your conquests rapines and robberies?”95

For this reason, after initially extolling natural law injunctions, Vattel
dismissed them and recommended instead a focus on the “voluntary law of
nations,” which, he argued, aimed to secure the common advantage of states.96
The voluntary law of nations, however, did not prohibit war. Nor, for
Vattel, should it, for “warfare which would be illegal on one side and
therefore outside the law would create chaotic conditions,” culminating in the
opposite of Immanuel Kant’s idealistic vision of perpetual peace, 97 i.e.,
perpetual war. Any peace, Vattel worried, would be only temporary were
postwar reconfigurations of power subject to legal challenge.98 While Vattel
nominally embraced the dualistic axiom, 99 one may question its value or
meaning given the virtual absence of constraints on war during this era. In
positive international law, war became just another tool of statecraft, to be
deployed for any reason or no reason at the sovereign’s discretion.
After World War I, some international lawyers sought to revive just war
doctrine as a framework for a reinvigorated law of war. Their efforts failed
dismally. By then, Christianity had become an untenable foundation for an
aspirationally universal international law, which sought to bind states with
diverse religious mores. But except for the residual influence of chivalry, the
just war tradition lacked a secular foundation. 100 Given this history, it is
curious that when just war theory enjoyed an intellectual revival in the latter
half of the twentieth century, 101 theorists treated the dualistic axiom as an
entrenched part of that intellectual tradition. In fact, the idea that restraints on
91. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 188, at 589 (Béla Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., 2008) (1758).
92. See id. §§ 183-84, at 586.
93. Id. § 188, at 589 (emphasis added).
94. Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 475.
95. VATTEL, supra note 91, § 188, at 589; see also Sassòli, supra note 11, at 243.
96. VATTEL, supra note 91, § 189, at 590.
97. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (Lewis White Beck ed., Liberal Arts Press 1957)
(1795).
98. Von Elbe, supra note 49, at 683; see VATTEL, supra note 91, § 190, at 591.
99. VATTEL, supra note 91, § 191, at 591.
100. Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 475; see also von Elbe, supra note 49, at 687;
Kunz, supra note 46, at 529.
101. See Johnson, supra note 57, at 172-80.
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the conduct of hostilities should apply equally to all belligerents, whatever
their casus belli, emerged late in the evolution of just war doctrine and never
acquired the axiomatic character that it now enjoys.
B.

Evolution of the Dualistic Axiom in International Law
1.

War as a Metajuristic Phenomenon

Vitoria, Suárez, Gentili, Grotius, and others of lesser repute integrated
just war theory into what would become the public law of Europe and, in time,
international law.102 It would be artificial in this regard to treat the modern law
of war as distinct from its theological and natural law roots. Yet the evolution
of the dualistic axiom in international law is in a sense the mirror image of its
evolution in the just war tradition. Just war theory focused first and foremost
on the jus ad bellum and only latterly on the jus in bello; international law
largely abandoned any pretense to a jus ad bellum until the advent of the U.N.
Charter in 1945 and focused foremost on the jus in bello—for “[w]ar being
legal and inevitable, no other task was to be performed by States than that of
making humanitarian rules regarding the conduct of hostilities.”103
This process began in earnest in the nineteenth century. The rise of IHL
dates to several milestones in the latter half of that century: when Henri
Dunant witnessed the Battle of Solferino (1859) and then founded the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (1864);104 when, during the
Civil War, Francis Lieber wrote and President Lincoln promulgated the
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field
(1863);105 and when states drafted the first Geneva Convention (1864) and the
St. Petersburg Declaration (1868). 106 These and subsequent developments
shaped an early jus in bello that viewed war as a “metajuristic phenomenon,”
an inevitable if tragic fact of life, “extra-legal rather than illegal.”107 The idea
of just war—insofar as it had ever been understood in legal rather than
religious or ethical terms—virtually vanished with the rise of the modern
nation-state. The “liberum jus ad bellum, the right of the absolute sovereign to
102. Cf. Benedetto Conforti, The Doctrine of “Just War” and Contemporary International
Law, 2002 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 5 (describing Vitoria as “half theologian and half lawyer or, better, a
kind of bridge between medieval scholars and the founders of the modern science of international law”).
103. Id. at 3; see also Arnold D. McNair, Collective Security, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 150, 151
(1936) (quoting WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (J.B. Atlay ed., 5th
ed. 1904)).
104. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR’S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN
CONSCIENCE 109-63 (1998) (tracing the founding and evolution of the ICRC).
105. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General
Orders No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863) (“Lieber Code”), reprinted in 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 63. The Lieber Code did not purport to be declaratory of international law; it
applied only to the Union’s forces during the Civil War. But it inspired comparable codes in Europe and
elsewhere. GREEN, supra note 50, at 29-30.
106. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field,
Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361; Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War, of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau
Recueil (ser. 1) 474, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 95 (Supp. 1907).
107. McNair, supra note 103, at 150, 152; see also id. at 150-51 (citing jurists such as Brierly,
Hall, Westlake, and Oppenheim to the same effect).
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initiate war for reasons of state,”108 displaced the theological jus ad bellum.
States continued to justify their wars with just war rhetoric.109 But until the
post-World War I era,110 international law regarded resort to war as a liberty
of states, unregulated by law. 111 This liberty, combined with a new
humanitarian ethos, supplied a new—and very different—rationale for the
equal application of the jus in bello to all belligerents than the old theological
(empirical) anxiety about the divine will.112
The dualistic axiom’s emergence in classical international law therefore
differs significantly from its evolution in the just war tradition. In short,
because international law imposed no restraint on resort to war, the jus in
bello logically could not depend on any jus ad bellum: no such body of law
existed. That is why treaties codifying the jus in bello did not refer to the
justice or legality of war, only to mitigating its hardships.113 To this day, the
idea that animates the jus in bello, embodied in the ICRC’s ethos, is that
“human suffering is human suffering, whether incurred in the course of a ‘just
war’ or not. . . . Humanity, not Justice, is its prime concern.”114
2.

From Bellum Justum to Bellum Legale

As late as 1943, international lawyers continued to describe resort to war
as “a metajuristic phenomenon, an event outside the range and control of the
law.”115 War simply modified “the status of the belligerents, and, to a certain
extent, the status of third powers,” replacing the law of peace with that of
war. 116 Yet two years later, after the most brutal and destructive war in
Western history, they sought to subject this metajuristic phenomenon to law—
but emphatically not in just war terms. While the advent of the U.N. Charter
(which prohibits, with two exceptions,117 any resort to force118) established a
new jus ad bellum, it did not clarify whether and, if so, how the jus in bello
would change commensurately.119 Nothing in the Charter’s language speaks to
the relationship between the new jus ad bellum and the inherited jus in bello—
108. Johnson, supra note 57, at 170; see also von Elbe, supra note 49, at 684; Gardam, supra
note 52, at 396.
109. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 14; DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 67.
110. The League of Nations Covenant contained antecedents to the effort to outlaw war, but the
principle received its first authoritative enunciation in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, General Treaty for
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
111. DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 67; see also 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 114-15 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002). The Hague Convention (III) of 1907
introduced certain formal requirements—for example, that hostilities be preceded by a declaration of
war and that neutral powers notified promptly—but did not purport to deny states the absolute right to
engage in hostilities as a tool of statecraft. Hague Convention (III) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, 205 Consol. T.S. 263.
112. DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 156; Greenwood, supra note 11, at 225.
113. E.g., Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War pmbl., July 27, 1929, 47
Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343; Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277; Hague Convention (II) with Respect to
the Laws and Customs of War on Land pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 187 Consol. T.S. 429.
114. GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 4-5 (1980).
115. Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 477.
116. Id.; von Elbe, supra note 49, at 684.
117. U.N. Charter arts. 42 (Security Council enforcement), 51 (self-defense).
118. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
119. Greenwood, supra note 11, at 225.
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except, perhaps, insofar as its preamble and scattered references to human
rights or dignity elsewhere in the Charter 120 may be read to reinforce the
humanitarian ethos of the extant jus in bello and so to imply that IHL should
remain applicable equally to all belligerents, whatever their ad bellum status.
Common Articles 1 and 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 affirmed
that the jus in bello codified in those treaties applied in “all circumstances”
and to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict.”121 But this
did not resolve how it applied. It did not resolve, for example, the question
whether customary principles of military necessity and proportionality—or
treaty prohibitions on poison weapons, expanding bullets, and the like—
should apply equally were one U.N. member state illegally to invade another
(in breach of Article 2(4)), and the invaded state legally to respond in selfdefense (under Article 51). Nor did it resolve whether the jus in bello should
apply equally to force authorized by the Security Council. It would be at least
plausible to say, as some indeed did at that time, that for an aggressor
violating Article 2(4) of the Charter, no amount of force could be necessary or
proportional. These principles require a lawful military objective relative to
which they can be applied:122 Necessary for what? Proportional to what? If an
aggressor lacks the right to use any force, then how can a particular quantum
of force be lawful?
Protocol I offers another, and the most unequivocal, textual basis for the
dualistic axiom. For states parties, at least, the Conventions and “th[e]
Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are
protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the
nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or
attributed to the Parties to the conflict.”123 Yet Article 1(4) confers in bello
belligerent rights on some, but not all, nonstate belligerents, namely, peoples
“fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.” Many decried this
proviso for, in their view, effectively reintroducing into the law the discredited
distinction between just and unjust wars. 124 It thereby cast at least some
arguable doubt on Protocol I’s otherwise categorical affirmation of the
dualistic axiom. 125 Protocol II also confirmed the historical asymmetry
between state and nonstate combatants. It retained international law’s
traditional prohibition on “private armies” 126 and did not offer combatant
120. See, e.g., U.N. Charter pmbl.; id. art. 1, para. 3; id. art. 55(c).
121. Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, arts. 1-2.
122. See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 89, at 682 (“Clarification of the conception of
proportionality requires, at the outset, specification of the base in relation to which the response in
reprisal must be proportional.”).
123. See Protocol I, supra note 30, pmbl.
124. See Antonio Cassese, The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed
Conflict and Customary International Law, 3 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 55, 69 & n.56 (1984); G.I.A.D.
Draper, Wars of National Liberation and War Criminality, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR, supra note 66, at
135, 157-60; Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of
Additional Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 109, 124-27 (1986); Sassòli, supra note 11, at 255; Abraham
Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 901, 913 (1986).
125. See, e.g., NEFF, supra note 21, at 374.
126. This rule, which contemporary and classical international law alike embrace, prohibits
“the use of force by entities not associated with or operating under delegation from a nation-state.” W.
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immunity to those fighting on behalf of nonstate belligerents in internal
conflicts.127
Yet in modern IHL, the dualistic axiom does not depend on these textual
references; it is rather, or so many argue, custom.128 If it is custom, however,
then, like the prohibition on official torture, it may well be custom despite,
rather than because of, state practice. 129 It is difficult to appraise any war
honestly without recognizing that international lawyers, not to mention
belligerents, appraise the conduct of hostilities differently depending on each
side’s avowed casus belli. Participants at different levels of the international
legal process express divergent views on the correct application of the jus in
bello, and those views frequently seem to reflect their perceptions of the
legality or justice of particular conflicts.130
Lawful or just belligerents, for example, however they may be defined in
context, tend to receive more deference in their application of in bello
proportionality than do unlawful or unjust ones.131 NATO’s aerial war against
Serbia may well be a case in point. The decision to fly at a minimum height of
15,000 feet so as to guarantee that NATO would suffer no casualties
contributed to the death of about five hundred Serbian civilians and devastated
Serbia’s infrastructure.132 Would the ex post appraisal of NATO’s decision
have differed had its ad bellum goal been to conquer and colonize Serbia
rather than to halt the incipient ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars? Or
consider the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon: each side
confidently justified its conduct of hostilities and accused the other of
proportionality violations—although neither seemed to know whether they
meant ad bellum or in bello.133 Finally, consider how perceptions of justice,
and the stark contrast between good and evil in the Second World War,
affected ex post appraisals of Allied carpet bombing of German and Japanese
cities, including the fire bombing of Dresden and the atomic destruction of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Nevertheless, no state today expresses the view that the justice of its
casus belli (or the injustice of its opponent’s) relieves it of or even relaxes its
Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 4
(1973).
127. Protocol II does not authorize private armies, comprised of nonstate combatants, to engage
in organized violence. Protocol II, supra note 4. In theory their members could be prosecuted for
ordinary crimes like murder, as well as war crimes, after the conflict. It states only that after “hostilities,
the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have
participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed
conflict, whether they are interned or detained.” Id. art. 6, para. 5.
128. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 407 (collecting state practice); see also DINSTEIN, supra note
13, at 158-59 (also collecting state practice); Greenwood, supra note 11, at 225 (describing the axiom as
a longstanding “fundamental tenet” of the jus in bello and noting that “the preponderance of state
practice and the vast majority of writers continue to support” the axiom); Lauterpacht, supra note 11, at
215-20 (collecting judicial decisions).
129. See Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 & n.15 (2d Cir. 1980); see also ROSALYN
HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 22 (1994).
130. See Sassòli, supra note 11, at 257-58.
131. See Gardam, supra note 52, at 392-93, 412. For a detailed analysis of how ad bellum
perceptions shaped in bello conduct in the 1991 Gulf War, see Judith G. Gardam, Noncombatant
Immunity and the Gulf Conflict, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 813 (1992).
132. See infra notes 290-300 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 315-327 and accompanying text.
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in bello obligations. Just as the persistence of official torture in state practice
does not necessarily defeat the conclusion that it violates customary
international law,134 so the dualistic axiom may well remain custom despite
not infrequent incidents of arguably inconsistent state practice. The critical
question is why this custom exists—and how to understand and apply it in an
era in which neither theological doubt nor the absence of a jus ad bellum
supplies its rationale.
C.

The Ad Bellum-In Bello Relationship in the Charter Era

A common but mistaken view of the contemporary relationship between
jus ad bellum and jus in bello is that ad bellum judgments precede and operate
in a sphere analytically distinct from in bello judgments. Once hostilities
begin, belligerents cross a kind of legal Rubicon separating the spheres of war
and peace: thereafter, “ius ad bellum ceases to be relevant and ius in bello
takes control.”135 And whatever the ad bellum legality of the initial resort to
armed force, particular acts must then be judged solely by the jus in bello,
which applies uniformly to all belligerents. Yet this view, which arguably
made sense for so long as no genuine jus ad bellum existed, is now
anachronistic.136 Contemporary state practice belies the traditional assumption
of a “sharp distinction between peace and war.”137 In fact, a sharp distinction
probably never existed; only intermittent and fluctuating levels of conflict did.
But given the increase in low-intensity conflicts, civil wars, transnational
terrorism, insurgencies, and other organized violence by nonstate belligerents,
this observation applies a fortiori in the twenty-first century.
The U.N. Charter’s introduction of a positive jus ad bellum broke down
the formerly distinct legal spheres of war and peace such that ad bellum and in
bello principles now can, and often should, operate concurrently.138 Any use
of force must be necessary and proportional relative to both the jus ad bellum
and the jus in bello.139 The in bello concepts of necessity and proportionality
have ad bellum analogues—with quite distinct meanings. During the 1991
Iraq War, for example, coalition forces sought
to isolate and incapacitate the Iraqi regime. . . . The legitimacy of this objective . . . is a
matter for the proportionality equation in ius ad bellum. The detailed conduct of the
attacks on [particular] targets is a matter for the proportionality equation in IHL, and in
the case of the Persian Gulf conflict was worked out frequently on a daily basis. The

134. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 & n.15; HIGGINS, supra note 129, at 20-22; cf. Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 838-42 (1997) (arguing that a new form of customary
international law, which tends, among other things, to be more attenuated from state practice, has
emerged in the postwar era and citing Filartiga’s conclusion that custom prohibits torture as an
example).
135. Greenwood, supra note 11, at 221; cf. KOTZSCH, supra note 11, at 84 (describing the jus in
bello as “all the rules for which the outbreak of war is the condition sine qua non,” which “come into
force only when hostilities are in progress”).
136. Greenwood, supra note 11, at 221.
137. Id. at 221-22 (citing BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 1-129, 384-401).
138. Id. at 222-25.
139. See GARDAM, supra note 27, at 10-11; HIGGINS, supra note 129, at 230-34; Greenwood,
supra note 11, at 223.
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timing and level of command at which the decisions are made in ius ad bellum and IHL
respectively, therefore, will differ.140

Even more generally, the jus ad bellum now applies not only to the initial
decision to resort to force but also to all conduct “involving the use of force
which occurs during the course of hostilities.” That conduct must be necessary
and proportionate to the casus belli.141
This proposition need not, as some argue, lead to absurdly or unduly
restrictive constraints, for example, “that a state which has been the object of
an illegal attack can never take the initiative or that its forces may only fire if
fired upon”142—although, as we will see below, this position appears to be
precisely what the ICJ implied in its Oil Platforms judgment.143 Instead, the
proper referent of ad bellum proportionality changes with the nature and
scope of the conflict. Initially, perhaps, defensive force must be ad bellum
proportionate to the injury inflicted. But in any sustained conflict, a state may,
and at some stage perforce will, cease to calculate ad bellum proportionality
by reference to the “injury received” and instead consider “the object
legitimately to be achieved.”144 Ad bellum proportionality generally tries to
minimize unauthorized force by requiring states to use no more than necessary
for self-defense.145 But, realistically, in any sustained conflict, the effect of ad
bellum proportionality as a genuine constraint on force will diminish as the
objectives of that force multiply and expand.146
Furthermore, “sustained” can no longer be understood to refer solely to
prolonged interstate wars. Perhaps the paramount question for the
contemporary jus ad bellum is under what circumstances an accumulation of
discrete attacks by nonstate belligerents operating from a host state—even if
no one of these attacks would, in isolation, justify force against that state—
may in the aggregate be deemed an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, giving rise to a right of self-defense. Suppose, for example, that
the United States responded to al-Qaeda’s attack on the U.S.S. Cole by
invading Afghanistan. Doubtless that would have been an ad bellum violation:
it would have been ad bellum disproportionate to the injury received. But few
would deny that the Cole’s bombing generated some right to engage in
proportionate self-defense. In contrast, the invasion of Afghanistan and ouster
of the Taliban in response to the far more severe attacks of 9/11, especially in
combination with a history of previous strikes by al-Qaeda, were
overwhelmingly regarded as lawful despite their formal noncompliance with
the positive jus ad bellum.147 Al-Qaeda’s attacks could not be attributed to
140. GARDAM, supra note 27, at 21 (footnote omitted).
141. Greenwood, supra note 11, at 223.
142. Id.
143. See infra notes 234-246 and accompanying text; see also Schachter, supra note 29, at 315
(noting that “[t]he U.N. Security Council,” too, “in several cases, most involving Israel, has judged
proportionality by comparing the response on a quantitative basis to the single attack which preceded
it”).
144. HIGGINS, supra note 129, at 231.
145. GARDAM, supra note 27, at 16.
146. See id. at 12.
147. But see Jack Beard, America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under
International Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559 (2002) (arguing that, even in a formal or positivist
sense, the U.S. response complied with the jus ad bellum on self-defense).
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Afghanistan under the law of state responsibility,148 and the Taliban did not
exercise effective control over al-Qaeda. 149 Still, the Security Council,
regional organizations, and many foreign states explicitly supported the U.S.
response, strongly implying that they viewed it as lawful.150 As this example
suggests, ad bellum proportionality must be appraised contextually.
Yet despite the postwar effort to subject war to law, the jus ad bellum
remains, as it has been historically, manipulable and often highly
politicized.151 In contrast, the jus in bello, including in bello proportionality,
strives to remain agnostic about the architectural goals of war. It insists that
each strike be proportionate in that it not inflict excessive civilian harm
relative to the concrete military advantage sought by the particular attack.152
Of course, this is easy to state abstractly but notoriously difficult to apply.153
IHL, as explored below, urgently needs to develop the concrete details of in
bello proportionality. The point of emphasis here is that, today, in contrast to
the prewar era, both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello apply concurrently
throughout an armed conflict—and this creates circumstances rife with the
potential for conflation of these distinct bodies of law.
III. THE SOURCES AND LOGIC OF CONFLATION
The concurrent operation of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello can lead
to at least three forms of ad bellum-in bello conflation, which may initially
appear logical: (1) an aggressor-defender model of war, which denies the
dualistic axiom by reference to the maxim ex injuria jus non oritur (a right
may not arise from an illegal act); (2) allowing ad bellum proportionality to
influence its in bello analogue; and (3) vitiating the dualistic axiom in
circumstances of perceived national crisis—what the literature denotes
“supreme emergency.”154 Despite international law’s embrace of the dualistic
148. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts arts. 8-9,
11, in Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
10) at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 20, 47-49, 52-54, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Pt 2); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 117-25 (June 27).
149. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 125.
150. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); Press Release, N. Atl. Council, Statement by the North Atlantic Council
(Sept. 12, 2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm; Org. of Am. States [OAS], Terrorist
Threat to the Americas, O.A.S. Res. RC.24/RES.1/01 (Sept. 21, 2001), http://www.oas.org/OASpage/
crisis/RC.24e.htm.
151. To take a recent example—did Russian troops enter Georgia, as Russia says, to protect the
people of South Ossetia from atrocities perpetrated by the Georgian military in its effort to retake that
province or, as Georgia says, to annex the pro-Russian breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia? Compare, e.g., Mikhail Gorbachev, Russia Never Wanted a War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2008,
at A20, with Russia’s War of Ambition, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at A20. See also Anne Barnard,
Russia Broadens Military Campaign as All-Out War Threatens Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, at
A1; Nicholas D. Kristof, Obama, Misha and the Bear, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A43.
152. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 51(5)(b) (emphasis added); cf. Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a)(iv), adopted July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 93 (July 1, 2002)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
153. See, e.g., William J. Fenwick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 539, 545-46 (1997).
154. E.g., WALZER, supra note 1, at 251-68; MICHAEL WALZER, Emergency Ethics, in
ARGUING ABOUT WAR, supra note 18, at 33.
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axiom, these forms of conflation challenge its vitality at an abstract level—
with concrete consequences for IHL’s capacity to protect human rights and
reduce superfluous suffering in war. This Section explicates the logic of
conflation; I defer to the next examples of how this logic affects the law and
practice of war.
A.

The Aggressor-Defender Model

Before the U.N. Charter regime, the dualistic axiom rested on two
rationales, one theological, the other legal. First, in just war theory, anxiety
about the opaque will of the Christian God led theologians to advocate
moderation in war by all belligerents, for it would often be impossible to
know which fought in the service of divine justice, a doctrine known generally
as “probabilism.” Second, in classical international law, the absence of a jus
ad bellum rendered the idea of conditioning the application of the jus in bello
on the former’s observance incoherent. In an era when resort to war could not
meaningfully be characterized as lawful or unlawful, it made no sense to
condition the application of the rules governing the conduct of war on such a
characterization. One reason for conflation in the contemporary law of war is
that neither of these rationales remains, strictly speaking, applicable.
First, modern just war theorists either repudiate theology as the basis for
their views or embrace a more expansive conception of the jus in bello—for it
is, of course, no longer tenable for theologians to argue that just combatants
may kill heathens without restraint because the former fight in the service of
God. 155 Indeed, that view would be indistinguishable in principle from the
justifications for sacred terrorism espoused by terrorist networks like alQaeda.156 Second, in international law, the postwar introduction of a jus ad
bellum begs the question why aggressors should continue to benefit from the
jus in bello. The general principle of law ex injuria jus non oritur holds that
rights cannot arise from illegal acts. On this view, a war initiated in violation
of the Charter’s jus ad bellum should give rise to no in bello rights.
A study by the Institut de droit international undertaken shortly after the
Charter’s introduction, which reflects a strain of thought not uncommon at
that time, indeed concluded “that ‘there cannot be complete equality’ in the
operation of the rules of warfare when the competent organ of the United
Nations determines that one of the belligerents has resorted to armed force
unlawfully.” 157 To some, that is, the Charter had in effect restored the
medieval primacy of the jus ad bellum and rendered the jus in bello dependent
155. Contemporary Christian just war theorists tend to conceptualize the doctrine in terms of
natural law rather than, strictly, theology. O’BRIEN, supra note 46, at 15. Secular just war theorists tend
to argue in terms of normative ethics. Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, for example, the locus classicus
of modern just war theory, describes itself as a work of “practical morality” and deliberately avoids
ethical foundations. WALZER, supra note 1, at xxiii.
156. See, e.g., OSAMA BIN LADEN, MESSAGES TO THE WORLD: THE STATEMENTS OF OSAMA BIN
LADEN 61 (Bruce Lawrence ed., James Howarth trans., 2005); Michael Moss & Souad Mekhennet, The
Guidebook For Taking A Life, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, § 4, at 1.
157. DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 159 (quoting Resolution, Equality of Application of the Rules
of the Law of War to Parties to an Armed Conflict, 50(II) ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 376 (1963)).
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on the legality of the initial resort to force. 158 From this perspective,
henceforth
the accepted rules of war [would] operate only at the option of the States resisting
aggression; . . . such States may modify them at will; and . . . the aggressor State or States
cannot derive from their initial illegality any legal rights, including the rights usually
associated with the conduct of war.159

Others did not draw this radical conclusion but thought it would be injudicious
for international law to focus on the jus in bello. They feared that its
elaboration would interfere with the postwar aspiration to prohibit war
altogether by implicitly legitimizing wars fought in conformity with IHL.160
These fears yielded an aggressor-defender model of war that persists in the jus
in bello to a degree seldom recognized.
This model, which denies the dualistic axiom and instead affords the
perceived defender more leeway in its application of the jus in bello than it
does the perceived aggressor, is not strictly illogical given the Charter; it is,
experience attests, simply unrealistic. Lauterpacht argued in an early piece,
which retains its force today, that despite the Charter’s formal terms, “we
must visualize at least three sets of situations” involving force: (1) where the
Security Council resolves that one state is the aggressor and authorizes
collective security measures; (2) where the Council does not or, because of
institutional paralysis, cannot determine the aggressor by a formal resolution
but, nonetheless, an “overwhelming consensus” among states exists “as to
who in fact is the aggressor”; and (3)
where there has been no collective determination of aggression in any shape or form, but
where there is a conviction on the part of some States that one belligerent party is the
aggressor and that it is waging an illegal war. That conviction may be held by both
belligerent sides, mutually charging one another with being guilty of aggression. States
outside the conflict may be equally so divided in their assessment of the legal merits of
the struggle.161

The Charter’s drafters clearly hoped that the first situation would
become the norm. As early as 1953, however, it had become clear that the
latter two situations had to “be regarded as typical, and that any discussion of
the effects of the illegality of the war as it results from the first possibility
partakes of a distinct measure of unreality.” 162 Absent an authoritative
decision on force’s legality, which an institutionally paralyzed Security
Council could seldom provide, each belligerent would inevitably justify force
by reference to the Charter, typically as self-defense under Article 51—just as,
in earlier times, each would inevitably, if disingenuously, claim the mantle of
justice for itself and deny it to the other. Little had changed since theologians
and early international lawyers struggled with the will-of-God paradox: that
158. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 406 & n.1 (collecting sources).
159. Lauterpacht, supra note 11, at 206; see also id. at 210.
160. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 4 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 10) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/925 (1949), reprinted in [1949] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 281, ¶ 18,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/13/1949; see also FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 18
(1987).
161. Lauterpacht, supra note 11, at 207.
162. Id. at 207.
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although it may be absurd to think that a war can be just on both sides in the
sight of God, it will seldom be possible to ascertain on which side divine
justice lies. And so “the plea of self-defence will be invoked alike by the
guilty belligerent and by his victim.”163
In short, the U.N. Charter enacted a regime in which it would be
plausible to distinguish the jus in bello applicable to the aggressor from that
applicable to the defender. In this view, an aggressive war initiated in
violation of the Charter “should no longer confer upon the guilty belligerent
all the rights to which he was entitled under traditional international law.”164
But because international law is a defective legal system, especially insofar as
it tries to regulate resort to force, in practice,
any application to the actual conduct of war of the principle ex injuria jus non oritur
would transform the contest into a struggle which may be subject to no regulation at all.
The result would be the abandonment of most rules of warfare, including those which are
of a humanitarian character. . . . [T]hey would in fact cease to operate if their operation
were made dependent upon the legality of the war on the part of one belligerent or group
of belligerents.165

Lauterpacht’s argument became received wisdom.166 Largely for the reasons
he advanced, the dualistic axiom finds ample support in modern treaties,
military manuals, and judicial decisions applying the law of war. 167 Yet
despite this theoretical consensus, the aggressor-defender model persists in
practice to a degree not fully appreciated. As Lauterpacht predicted, it
degrades the efficacy of the law.
B.

Proportionality

A second form of conflation involves confusion of ad bellum and in
bello proportionality. Suppose that Aggressor (A) attacks Victim (V). Perhaps
A claims to be defending himself or another. But that claim is manifestly
wrong or unreasonable—even pretextual. A’s resort to force is therefore
objectively illegal. Under the circumstances, no force may lawfully used by A
against V. How then can some force still be proportional? Several
contemporary political theorists offer essentially this syllogism to challenge
the dualistic axiom. McMahan, for example, argues that unjust combatants—
that is, soldiers fighting an unjust war—cannot comply with the jus in bello
because except where they “prevent wrongful acts by just combatants, their
acts of war cannot satisfy the proportionality requirement, and satisfaction of
this requirement is a necessary condition of permissible conduct in war.”168
This argument, while not theoretically unassailable, 169 cannot be
casually dismissed. It makes intuitive sense to say that the amount of tolerable
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
14, at 44.
169.

Id. at 220.
Id. at 212.
Id.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 406 n.3 (collecting authorities).
Id. at 407 & nn.2-7.
McMahan, Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 714; see also id. at 708; Hurka, supra note
E.g., Benbaji, supra note 43.
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collateral damage should be greater, for example, “in a war against a
genocidal enemy such as Nazi Germany . . . than in the Falklands War.”170
But from a legal perspective, the argument’s real defect lies in its collapse of
proportionality’s distinct ad bellum and in bello components. The assertion
that an unjust war cannot be fought justly, without violating in bello
proportionality, depends on the view that in bello proportionality calls for a
balance between, on the one hand, the in bello harms caused by force and, on
the other, the ultimate ad bellum goods to which that force purportedly
contributes. If those goods, by hypothesis, are objectively not good (or
unjust), then of course no force in an unjust war can be, in this particular
sense, proportional: the proportionality dice, so to speak, have been loaded
from the outset. And because proportionality is an essential part of the in bello
“rules,” it is equally clear, from this perspective, that the dualistic axiom’s
strict analytic distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is a fiction.171
Not coincidentally, this argument is strongly reminiscent of the scholastic
opinion that it would be absurd to suppose that a war can be just on both sides
in the sight of God.172
To their great credit, McMahan and Hurka alike stress that the “deep
morality” of war must not be confused with an account of the law of war.173
Yet because morality influences law, 174 it is important to clarify why the
foregoing syllogism is misguided in law, even were it correct in ethical
theory—a matter on which I share others’ doubts. Many disagree, in
particular, with the view that the ad bellum injustice of a state’s decision to
use force automatically transfers to its individual soldiers, rendering them
individually morally responsible, and indeed criminally liable, for
participating in organized violence on behalf of the political elites for whom
they fight. 175 Furthermore, it should never be forgotten—despite the
proliferation and general celebration of international criminal law in the postCold War era as one technique to enforce or vindicate IHL—that the main
purpose of the jus in bello is not to ascribe moral blame or criminal liability; it
is to protect human dignity and rights and to avert superfluous suffering to the
greatest extent possible in war.
By replacing bellum justum with bellum legale,176 postwar international
lawyers sought to unshackle the jus in bello from its historic dependence on
170. Hurka, supra note 14, at 44.
171. Id. at 44-45.
172. SUÁREZ, supra note 75, at 815-16.
173. McMahan, Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 730; cf. Hurka, supra note 14, at 45.
174. See McMahan, Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 731-32 (quoting WALZER, supra note 1,
at 133 (“The war convention must first be morally plausible . . . ; it must correspond to our sense of what
is right.”)); see also WALZER, supra note 1, at xxii (“Since positive international law is radically
incomplete, it is always possible to interpret it in the light of moral principles and to refer to the results
as ‘positive law.’”).
175. Although I agree with the traditional view, against which McMahan, Hurka, and others
argue, I do not mean to dismiss cavalierly their forceful and philosophically sophisticated arguments
against the view that individual soldiers should be exonerated because “of the coercive pressures and the
constraints on knowledge that often apply to those whose government orders them to fight.” McMahan,
Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 700; see also id. at 700-08; McMahan, Moral Equality, supra note
17, at 383-91; cf. DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF-DEFENSE 165-73 (2002). I do not, however, want to
digress into that ethical debate here.
176. Kunz, supra note 46, at 529-32.
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the jus ad bellum, which had been discredited for centuries before the advent
of the U.N. Charter—not least because the jus ad bellum had proved so
susceptible to self-serving characterizations and abuse. That is why it is
legally incorrect to say that military advantage may only justify collateral
damage if it contributes to an objectively good result.177 Postwar IHL instead
recognizes that even if an unjust (or illegal) belligerent’s military advantage
would objectively be an evil, in bello proportionality nonetheless must legally
consider it as if it were a good. Otherwise, in bello proportionality would
often be rendered meaningless by each belligerent’s self-serving ad bellum
judgment.178 In bello proportionality, according to the syllogism set out above,
would invariably yield the conclusion that unjust or illegal belligerents may
never inflict collateral damage. In fact, by the same logic, unjust belligerents
may never even kill and injure combatants with impunity, the most significant
belligerent right conferred by the jus in bello. That, too, from a moral
standpoint, may well be an evil, depending on the ultimate ad bellum
objective of the conflict. Again, however, postwar IHL recognizes that the jus
in bello would largely cease to function if self-serving judgments of this sort
were allowed to relieve belligerents of IHL obligations.
Whatever the force of the foregoing just war argument as a matter of
ethics, it is therefore a mistake, as a matter of law, to understand in bello
proportionality to require combatants to weigh in bello harms (for example,
death, suffering, or property destruction) against architectural ad bellum goods
(for example, self-defense, territorial conquest, or humanitarian
intervention)—that is, against the ultimate casus belli advanced to justify
force.179 In IHL, in bello proportionality instead deliberately tries to specify a
conception of military necessity that is conceptually removed from ad bellum
judgments about the legality or justice of the ultimate objectives of force.180
The answer to the question “in bello proportional to what?” is therefore not
the (just or unjust, legal or illegal) casus belli. Nor is it “‘the end [of
victory].’”181 Precisely because this good, if it is a good, will seldom be free
from doubt (even for soldiers fighting in good faith), in bello proportionality
instructs them to weigh the “concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated,”182 not the abstract casus belli, against the foreseeable harm to
civilians.
McMahan regards this view as plausible but says it trivializes in bello
proportionality’s moral dimension: “so understood,” he writes,
“proportionality is not a genuine moral requirement but merely a device that
177. Hurka, supra note 14, at 45.
178. Sassòli, supra note 11, at 246.
179. See McMahan, Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 713.
180. See WALZER, supra note 1, at 129. McMahan argues that “one cannot weigh the bad
effects that one would cause against the contribution one’s act would make to the end of victory without
having some sense of what the good effects of victory would be”; and “[i]f one’s cause is unjust, [for
example, the Nazi desire to create a supreme Aryan nation,] the value of the event—victory—would
presumably be negative, not positive.” McMahan, Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 715. That is right.
But, again, it is not an appropriate characterization of IHL’s in bello proportionality calculus, even if it
has force as a matter of normative ethics.
181. WALZER, supra note 1, at 129 (quoting HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 254
(London, Macmillan 1891)).
182. Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 51(5)(b) (emphasis added).
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serves the moral purpose of limiting the violence of those who ought not to be
engaged in warfare at all.” 183 But unless one takes for granted a purely
deontological account of what it means for a requirement to be genuinely
moral, it is unclear why this view of in bello proportionality trivializes its
moral dimension. In law, at any rate, IHL does not adopt one moral
perspective from among the predominant schools, i.e., either deontology or
teleology. Indeed, IHL’s norms cannot be reconciled with a univocal moral
theory.184 They manifest a moral eclecticism comprised of (both act and rule)
utilitarianism; 185 deontological insistence on the inalienability of certain
rights;186 and even a residuum of virtue ethics, especially if we appreciate that
enforcement dynamics (compliance as well as coercion) themselves constitute
a critical part of law.187 Consider two examples:
First, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which applies in
all cases “of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,” prohibits, as to “[p]ersons
taking no active part in the hostilities,” certain acts, including extrajudicial
killing and torture, “at any time and in any place whatsoever.”188 This rule,
which has been recognized as custom,189 is part of the jus in bello. It admits of
no exception, even though it is easy to envision circumstances in which utility
(however defined) would be better served by its violation.
Second, Protocol I prohibits “indiscriminate attacks.”190 That prohibition
takes an absolute form insofar as civilians may never, whatever the utility, “be
the object of attack.”191 But it otherwise takes a qualified form. It prescribes a
flexible calculus by describing as indiscriminate those attacks that “may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”192
In IHL, “the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” should
never be confused with, or allowed to collapse back into, the ultimate casus
belli of a party. By specifying the relevant yardstick at a lower level of
abstraction—one tied to the facts on the ground—IHL tries to remove
calculations of in bello proportionality from ultimate military objectives and
183. McMahan, Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 716.
184. See WALZER, supra note 1, at 130.
185. Act utilitarianism alone, as Walzer notes, fails to account for the jus in bello: because wars
recur, the effect of any IHL rule must be considered along a broader time horizon. See WALZER, supra
note 1, at 131 & n.
186. See W. Michael Reisman, Holding the Center of the Law of Armed Conflict, 100 AM. J.
INT’L L. 852, 852 (2006).
187. See IGNATIEFF, supra note 104, at 109-63.
188. Geneva Convention III, supra note 4, art. 3; see also Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No.
100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 628-33 (2006); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT, STUDY ON CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (2007), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/
html/customary-law-30-international-conference-121007.
189. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 69 (Oct. 2, 1995).
190. Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 51(4).
191. Id. art. 51(2) (emphasis added).
192. Id. art. 51(5)(b).
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oft-politicized ad bellum judgments. It tries, that is, to halt the slippery slope
from “concrete and direct military advantage” to “victory.” In law, even if not
in the deep morality of war,193 it is therefore incorrect to regard ad bellum
judgments as necessarily determinative of in bello proportionality
judgments—still less as relevant to in bello duties of an absolute nature, for
example, those that prohibit torture, extrajudicial killing, or denial of quarter.
Again, however, this form of conflation afflicts some recent state practice and
jurisprudence. Ad bellum proportionality, contrary to the dualistic axiom, at
times influences in bello proportionality.194
C.

“Supreme Emergency”: Threshold Deontology in IHL?

The final variant of the logic of conflation that threatens the dualistic
axiom is the concept of “supreme emergency.” Winston Churchill used this
phrase to describe Britain’s predicament in the early days of the Second
World War, when it seemed the Nazis would prevail. Walzer then coined it in
Just and Unjust Wars to refer to a threat to national survival dire enough to
warrant overriding otherwise absolute in bello constraints, including, for
example, the prohibition on intentionally targeting civilians—and presumably,
therefore, also tactics like terrorism, torture, and carpet bombing.195 At first
glance, the idea seems straightforward: if the ad bellum stakes become high
enough, in bello constraints may be overridden. It thus involves, as theorists
recognize, an explicit denial of the dualistic axiom.196
The doctrine of supreme emergency bears a family resemblance to the
moral theory known as threshold deontology. 197 Walzer, at least, seems to
understand it this way.198 Threshold deontology holds that people have rights,
which ordinarily must be respected without regard for the consequences, but
that if the bad consequences of respecting those rights become exceptionally
bad (precisely how bad is unclear and may vary), then those rights may be
temporarily overridden. Put otherwise, it insists on deontological rights up to a
particular threshold, but says it is morally permissible, perhaps even
mandatory, to treat those rights in a utilitarian fashion in extremely dire
circumstances. 199 As a generic thesis, threshold deontology has been
193. McMahan, Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 730.
194. See Gardam, supra note 52, at 412; see also CHRISTIAN WICKER, THE CONCEPTS OF
PROPORTIONALITY AND STATE CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-32 (2006).
195. See WALZER, supra note 1, at 251-68; see also WALZER, supra note 154, at 33-34;
MICHAEL WALZER, Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses, in ARGUING ABOUT WAR, supra note 18, at 51,
51-66.
196. WALZER, supra note 1, at 265.
197. See Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893 (2000); see
also CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 10 (1978); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 158 (1997).
198. Walzer says that “[w]hen our deepest values are radically at risk, the constraints lose their
grip, and a certain kind of utilitarianism reimposes itself.” WALZER, supra note 154, at 40; see also
WALZER, supra note 1, at 251-55.
199. This is admittedly somewhat of a caricature; it is for illustrative purposes only. It may well
be coherent to hold that rights (depending on their definition) merit a great deal of moral weight and take
precedence over ordinary public policy matters and considerations of utility, but that they may—or
must—be overridden by very substantial considerations of utility. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (1977). In a philosophical context, we would also want to distinguish carefully,
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powerfully criticized. The question here is whether it captures the logic of
supreme emergency as manifest in IHL. It is unclear that it does.
In particular, as Daniel Statman recently argued, supreme emergency
theory may not be a variant of threshold deontology at all, because it relies on
an ideological preference for the members of the polity—typically, the state—
that asserts a right to engage in otherwise prohibited uses of force that violate
the jus in bello: nuclear attacks, carpet bombing, torture, and so forth.200 That
may be why Walzer and like-minded theorists concede that even terrorism
could, not would, be justified (or excused?) in a supreme emergency: 201 it
depends on the nature of the polity. Ordinarily prohibited tactics of war
become permissible, for many supreme emergency theorists, only if they are
the exclusive way to prevent an untenable catastrophe to a polity of some
kind.
To quote the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons opinion (to which I will return
below, for it arguably relied on supreme emergency theory to answer a critical
international legal question), nuclear weapons may perhaps be used “in an
extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State
would be at stake.” 202 Supreme emergency doctrine, as manifest in this
quotation, seems to assume that states, as states, have an independent value,
which exceeds the aggregate interests of their constituents. In short, to
oversimplify, it assumes that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
This particular vision of polities originates in Rousseau’s conception of the
general will of a society, which has an “associative” value that exceeds the
“aggregative” value constituted by the sum of the interests of society’s
members. 203 That is why the survival of “a State” with, suppose, twenty
million citizens might justify a nuclear strike even if that strike kills forty
million or more others.
Supreme emergency theory in IHL may therefore not be best conceived
as a form of threshold deontology, a theory that ordinarily presupposes a
utilitarian framework that counts people equally. In fact, the thesis “that
collectives have a right to kill the innocent if it is the only way to protect
themselves from enslavement and massacre” often proves inconsistent with
utilitarianism because the latter posits that “collectives are allowed to give
priority to their own lives over the lives of others, only after it has been
demonstrated that such preference will lead to better results overall.”204 Yet
how can the death of an extra twenty million people be a better result unless
we ascribe a robust, independent moral value to the association of the
surviving twenty million as a state? Supreme emergency theory, as manifest
in the ICJ’s opinion, apparently prioritizes the survival of abstractions, i.e.,
states, over the happiness, preference, well-being, or other utilitarian unit of
as Hohfeld famously did, between the kinds of rights at stake. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
200. See Daniel Statman, Supreme Emergencies Revisited, 117 ETHICS 58 (2006).
201. WALZER, supra note 195, at 54; see also C.A.J. Coady, Terrorism, Morality and Supreme
Emergencies, 114 ETHICS 772 (2004).
202. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
266 (July 8) (emphasis added).
203. ROUSSEAU, supra note 34, at 147-49.
204. Statman, supra note 200, at 60.
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value relevant to concrete human beings. It seems, that is, to invest states as
such with a questionable moral status.
I say “questionable” because this status is redolent of the position states
held in classical, prewar international law, which regarded the state as its
fundamental subject. In contrast, contemporary, postwar international law,
especially as it relates to the initiation and conduct of hostilities, regards
people, not states, as its fundamental subject and unit of value. The
introduction of international human rights law in the postwar era shifted the
fulcrum of the international legal system from the protection of the interests of
states—which, in practice, generally meant the interests of their political
elites—to the protection of human beings.205 This need not entail that no value
may be ascribed to states based on their associative value as political
communities, but it does entail that, in the final analysis, “any rights states
have must derive from and concern the rights of their citizens.”206 A state’s
value, qua state, is contingent on the extent to which it represents a
normatively desirable polity,207 and that will vary. Why, after all, should the
survival of an autocratic regime like North Korea, which starves and
otherwise abuses its own citizens (or, for that matter, of Nazi Germany) justify
the use by that state of otherwise prohibited in bello tactics that cause
unconscionable human suffering?
In fact, then, supreme emergency theory emerges in this context not as a
variant of threshold deontology in IHL. Rather, it seems to be an assertion
about the law of “self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
[State] of the United Nations.”208 The law of self-defense is part of the jus ad
bellum, not the jus in bello. That is why supreme emergency theory can lead
to the conflation of these distinct bodies of the law: it confuses the (arguable)
ad bellum self-defense rights of certain states under the law of the U.N.
Charter and its progeny with the in bello rights of individuals. The danger of
this doctrine quickly becomes apparent if we recognize that it admits of no
limit. The ICJ did not rest its decision in this regard on anything unique about
nuclear weapons, or about the nature of the state whose survival might be at
stake. Its logic could equally vindicate any prohibited in bello tactic (torture,
terrorism, biological or chemical weapons, etc.),209 in defense of any polity.
To concede that such tactics may be lawful under exigent circumstances is a
serious cost of conflation.

205. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2-10 (1990); Luban, Just War and Human Rights,
supra note 35, at 208-11; Reisman, supra note 40, at 872.
206. Hurka, supra note 14, at 51; accord WALZER, supra note 1, at 53-55.
207. Even Walzer, who defends a more robust moral standing for states, agrees. WALZER,
supra note 1, at 54 (“The moral standing of any particular state depends upon the reality of the common
life it protects . . . . If no common life exists . . . its own defense may have no moral justification.”); see
also Richard Wasserstrom, 92 HARV. L. REV. 536, 540 (1978) (reviewing MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND
UNJUST WARS (1977)) (contending that Walzer’s defense of the rights of states becomes increasingly
disconnected from its original foundation in individual rights as the argument proceeds). But see Walzer,
supra note 34 (replying to, among others, Wasserstrom on this point).
208. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
209. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
266 (July 8). For further analysis, see infra notes 276-285 and accompanying text.
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THE COST OF CONFLATION

After each of the twentieth-century world wars, postwar architects—
with memories of war fresh in their minds—expected that states would be
prepared to forswear, or at least dramatically limit, resort to war, and by
focusing principally on the jus ad bellum, relegated the jus in bello to
secondary importance. 210 Post-World War I international lawyers sought to
revive just war theory; post-World War II international lawyers worried that
the elaboration of IHL would undermine their effort to ban war altogether. In
part for this reason, our understanding of ad bellum and in bello
proportionality, and their relation to the Charter’s general prohibition on force,
is impoverished. The following Sections use the vehicle of ICJ jurisprudence
and the evidence of recent state practice to suggest how and in what respects.
Before proceeding, however, I must clarify several methodological
points that I presuppose and that necessarily qualify the following analysis; it
would require too much of a digression to defend them here. First, it is often
(but not always) misguided to accept what the ICJ says as a reflection of what
the law presently is. Too many international lawyers tend to treat ICJ
decisions as though they were authoritative pronouncements from upon high
by an international court of last resort like the Supreme Court of the United
States. That is false as a matter of positive law: the ICJ’s decisions have no
binding force except relative to the parties to particular disputes 211 and no
formal precedential value,212 even though the Court and others often treat its
decisions as highly persuasive and even precedential. Yet in part for that very
reason, its decisions do matter: they send signals of varying strength to
different participants in the international legal process. The authority of these
signals depends on the nature of the recipient.
Second, the ICJ’s Statute textually limits the sources the Court may
apply to international disputes brought before it by state consent. 213 The
italicized words indicate two further qualifications: (1) because the ICJ Statute
limits the methodological lenses through which the ICJ analyzes disputes to
the positive sources enumerated in Article 38(1), it may be unsurprising—and
even jurisprudentially appropriate—that the Court sometimes marginalizes or
disregards sociopolitical dynamics that seem to influence the jus ad bellum,
the jus in bello, or their relationship; and (2) because states constitute only one
of the authors of force that international law strives to regulate today (others
include insurgents, terrorists, paramilitaries, transnational criminal syndicates,
militias, and so on), the capacity of the ICJ to pronounce on the contemporary
law of war is limited. Again, that does not make its decisions irrelevant. Few
other international institutions speak to major ad bellum issues in the law of
war with at least theoretical judicial impartiality.

210. See FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 2425 (3d ed. 2001).
211. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, U.N.
Charter app.
212. See id.
213. Id. art. 38(1).
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Finally, international law, particularly insofar as it strives to regulate the
initiation and conduct of armed hostilities, is a defective normative system.
That is one reason why so many arguments that international law is not really
law focus on its capacity to regulate war. But even in war, law is a variable in
the complex of factors that influences how states and other authors of
collective violence act (although the ICJ’s decisions reflect only one variable
of that variable). It would be as much a mistake to trivialize the role of
international law as to overstate it. 214 If war lies at the vanishing point of
international law, itself the “vanishing point of law,” 215 still, international
law—because of, among other compliance dynamics, perceptions of
legitimacy and authority, reputation, reciprocity, habit, and the self-conception
of political actors—can influence how participants in war behave. 216
Conversely, insofar as the law fails to recognize, or to offer realistic guidance
in view of, technological, geopolitical, and other changes in modern warfare,
the force of its norms will diminish commensurately. In the next Section, I
critique some of the ICJ’s jurisprudence and construction of the Charter from
this general methodological perspective. To be clear, I do not argue that each
and every judgment below evinces conflation so much as that the ad bellum
framework established and inflexibly preserved by the Court’s jurisprudence
in this area contributes to it.
A.

Conflation and the ICJ’s Jurisprudence of War
1.

Corfu Channel

Perhaps because the Charter’s drafters envisioned self-defense only as a
failsafe in the event of an actual armed attack, in circumstances where
immediate collective action would not be feasible,217 the ICJ has repeatedly
construed Article 51 restrictively—more so than its ordinary meaning
suggests.218 The ICJ’s consistent policy, despite vast changes in the nature of
war since 1945, has been to minimize the contingencies for transborder

214. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly
Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 544 (1971).
215. Lauterpacht, supra note 11, at 381-82.
216. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 39, at 92-98. In general, I presuppose that the efficacy of
any norm of international law is a function of its variation along three communicative dimensions: (1) its
policy content—the mandate communicated, more or less clearly, by that norm; (2) authority signal—
the extent to which the norm seems authoritative or legitimate to those to whom it is communicated; and
(3) control intention—the expectation that sufficient resources will be invested by those with power in
the international system to make the norm effective—in common parlance, to “enforce” it. See, e.g., W.
Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 78 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 101 (1981).
217. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE 45 (2002); see also U.N. Charter art. 51.
218. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Court has held, for
example, as recently as 2004 and 2005, that self-defense may be invoked only against states. See Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, paras. 144-47
(Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 194-95 (July 9). Yet the plain text of Article 51 does not place that
limitation on what it describes as an “inherent” right of self-defense; the right is simply triggered if “an
armed attack occurs.” U.N. Charter art. 51. The author of that attack need not be another state.
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violence. 219 In Corfu Channel, 220 the ICJ’s first judgment—and the first to
pronounce (in dictum) on the new jus ad bellum of the Charter—the Court
held unlawful a U.K. mine-sweeping operation carried out in Albanian
territorial waters in the Corfu Strait. The United Kingdom swept that strait
after an incident in which British warships had been disabled and casualties
suffered because of the mines. While the Court held Albania liable for its
mining and affirmed the customary right of warships to innocent passage
through straits, it denied the United Kingdom’s asserted entitlement to selfhelp in the face of Albania’s mining of the Corfu Strait and attacks on British
vessels traversing it.
In a well-known dictum, the ICJ wrote that it could “only regard the
alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as
has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot,
whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in
international law.”221 Corfu Channel has thus, accurately or not, come to stand
for the proposition that Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the unilateral resort to
force does not depend on whether, or how effectively, the U.N. Charter’s
collective security machinery functions.222 This may be inevitable, for as a
creature of the U.N. Charter, it would be remarkable for the Court to declare
the Charter a dead letter. Yet Corfu Channel created a disconnect between the
formal law of the Charter, as elaborated by the ICJ, and actual state practice.
This disconnect has become increasingly apparent over time. It has led the
ICJ, at times, to elide, confuse, or simply fail to engage with difficult but
pressing questions raised by the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello in
subsequent law-of-war opinions.
2.

Nicaragua

More than thirty-five years later, in the watershed judgment in Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,223 the Court not only
reinforced the dictum in Corfu Channel;224 it went on to establish, based on
little more than a nonbinding resolution of the General Assembly defining
aggression,225 a high threshold for the sort of armed attack under Article 51
that would suffice to permit a state lawfully to respond in self-defense.226 In
particular, the Court drew a dubious and vague distinction between “mere
frontier incident[s]” and “armed attack[s],” and it held that only the latter give
219. Reisman, supra note 10, at 83-84.
220. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
221. Id. at 35.
222. See Christopher Greenwood, The International Court of Justice and the Use of Force, in
FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 379 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice
eds., 1996); see also HIGGINS, supra note 129, at 240; Manley O. Hudson, The Twenty-Eighth Year of
the World Court, 44 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1950).
223. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14 (June 27).
224. Id. at 103-04.
225. Id. at 93-94 (citing G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex art. 3, para. (g), U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974)).
226. Id.; see Greenwood, supra note 222, at 380; Oscar Schachter, Disputes Involving the Use
of Force, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 223, 223 (Lori Fisler Damrosch
ed., 1987).
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rise to an ad bellum right of self-defense.227 State practice and opinio juris—
the textbook components of custom, which the ICJ purported to ascertain
independently, but which it conveniently and without much analysis found to
supply a customary law identical to the Charter—indicated a far more
complex regime. 228 But whatever the accuracy of the Court’s holding as a
matter of custom, the upshot of Nicaragua is that states which suffer attacks
that fall short of the ICJ’s “armed attack” threshold must, in its view, simply
endure low-intensity violence, even in the face of a paralyzed Security
Council that proves consistently unable to respond as the Charter
presupposes.229
Relative to the dualistic axiom, Nicaragua’s analysis of Articles 2(4)
and 51 (or rather, their purported customary analogues) encouraged one form
of conflation that afflicts the contemporary law of war: collapsing the initial
judgment about the legality of a particular resort to force into the ad bellum
proportionality inquiry. Nicaragua effectively detached the Article 51 selfdefense right from the Article 2(4) framework. It created a new lex specialis
of “armed attack” whereby only some uses of force that violate the Charter,
although illegal, may “be resisted by force in self-defense, no matter how
reasonably necessary and proportionate the latter may be, because only some
amount to an ‘armed attack.’” 230 And absent the “condition sine qua non
required for the exercise of the right of collective self-defence,” the ICJ said,
“the appraisal of . . . necessity and proportionality takes on a different
significance.”231
By restrictively redefining “armed attack” 232 and subordinating ad
bellum necessity and proportionality constraints to its initial judgments about
the legality of resort to force under the Charter, the ICJ established a regime
that prioritizes the oft-politicized ad bellum judgments that international law
(and previously, just war theory) historically has been unable to regulate
effectively. Partially for this reason, the ICJ has since struggled, largely in
vain, to cabin allegedly defensive uses of force rather than to confront the
difficult, but probably more constructive, regulatory issues about ad bellum
proportionality. Greenwood aptly asks
why a state that is the victim of one of the lesser forms of force should not resist such
force . . . by itself resorting to military means. . . . Of course one can sympathize with the
227. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103.
228. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L.
101, 103 (1987); Thomas M. Franck, Some Observations on the ICJ’s Procedural and Substantive
Innovations, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 116, 118-19 (1987).
229. E.g., Franck, supra note 228, at 120; Reisman, supra note 10, at 89. The ICJ said that
states victimized by low-intensity armed force may take “proportionate countermeasures,” Nicaragua,
1986 I.C.J. at 122, but this part of the judgment is notoriously vague. See HIGGINS, supra note 129, at
250-51.
230. John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force
and Self-Defense, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 138 (1987).
231. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 122. In Nicaragua and its progeny, the Court also adopted the
textually unfounded view that only states may be the authors of armed attacks giving rise to a right of
self-defense. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 119; see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, paras. 144-47 (Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 194-95
(July 9).
232. Greenwood, supra note 222, at 379.
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Court’s evident desire to ensure that a minor use of force does not lead to a wholly
excessive response. Any exercise of the right of self-defence is, however, subject to the
principle of proportionality. Insistence on compliance with that principle is a more
effective and realistic way of seeking to prevent an excessive military response than the
creation of an artificial distinction between different degrees of the use of force.233

In Nicaragua, as in Corfu Channel, the ICJ’s decision may to some
extent be both institutionally understandable and defensible. The ICJ sees
itself as the judicial guardian of the Charter’s ad bellum regime, and the Court
itself is a creature of the Charter. Yet that does not fully account for the
Court’s views, which seem to be motivated more by a tacit policy decision
than anything in the explicit language of the Charter. The ICJ’s focus on the
initial ad bellum legality of a use of force, and in particular, its lex specialis of
armed attack, has led it to marginalize those ad bellum components of the law
of war, especially proportionality, that might be more efficacious in practice.
And its approach in Nicaragua—to affirm a parsimonious definition of armed
attack and focus principally on the initial ad bellum legality of force rather
than to analyze contemporary, unconventional conflicts in all their
complexity—persists to date.
3.

Oil Platforms

Consider first Oil Platforms.234 Iran sought reparations for two strikes on
Iranian offshore oil complexes. The United States launched those strikes in
response to attacks on Kuwaiti vessels during the “Tanker War” between Iran
and Iraq.235 On October 16, 1987, a missile hit a Kuwaiti tanker, the Sea Isle
City, which had been reflagged to the United States for protection. The United
States ascribed the attack to Iran and responded three days later by attacking
Iranian oil complexes.236 On April 14, 1988, the Samuel B. Roberts “struck a
mine in international waters near Bahrain while returning from an escort
mission”; again, the United States ascribed the attack to Iran and responded by
attacking offshore Iranian oil platforms.237
Applying Nicaragua, the ICJ held that neither of these strikes, even in
the context of a broader pattern of Iranian attacks,238 qualified as an armed
attack sufficient to give rise to a right of self-defense under the Charter.239 It
then collapsed that initial judgment of ad bellum illegality into the question of
whether the U.S. strikes were proportionate to the incidents:240
As a response to the mining, by an unidentified agency, of a single United States warship,
which was severely damaged but not sunk, and without loss of life, neither ‘Operation
Praying Mantis’ as a whole, nor even that part of it that destroyed the Salman and Nasr

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6).
Id. at 174-76.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 192; id. at 195-96.
See id. at 197-99.
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platforms, can be regarded, in the circumstances of this case, as a proportionate use of
force in self-defence.241

At first blush, this may appear to be a reasonable application of ad bellum
proportionality. But in practice, the ICJ’s approach tends to eviscerate ad
bellum proportionality as a distinct constraint on force—for, in effect, it insists
that each military incident be atomized and analyzed in isolation rather than
contextually.
Rather than analyze the ad bellum necessity and proportionality of the
U.S. strikes in the context of the Tanker War and the pervasive threat to
neutral (including U.S.-flagged) vessels in the Persian Gulf, the ICJ
disaggregated the conflict into a series of discrete, atomized incidents.242 A
defensive strike is only ad bellum necessary, in this view, if carried out, first,
in immediate response to a particular attack and, second, against the attack’s
direct source.243 In contrast, the Court said, strategic strikes in self-defense
carried out in an effort to deter future attacks of the same sort were per se
unlawful. Once the initial attack ends, it reasoned, so too does the ad bellum
necessity for self-defense. 244 And because needless force is illegal, it must
also be disproportionate. Consequently, the ICJ remarked in a similar vein that
to be ad bellum proportionate, a strike must be proportional to the particular
atomized attack that prompts it, rather than to the object of self-defense in the
context of the conflict as a whole.245 The result of this logic is that ad bellum
necessity and proportionality dissolve as distinct constraints on the use of
force: they collapse back into the initial judgment about the legality of resort
to self-defense. Because few atomized strikes meet the Nicaragua threshold,
and because self-defense in response to any single strike will be, on this view,
241. Id. at 198-99.
242. In appraising ad bellum proportionality in dicta, however, the Court somewhat
inconsistently did focus on the broader context of conflict. It said that it could not ignore the fact that the
discrete U.S. strikes that formed the basis of Iran’s complaint were part of a broader defensive operation,
“Operation Praying Mantis,” and that the mining of a single ship “by an unidentified agency” could not
justify such a large-scale military operation. See id. at 198; see also id. at 194. If the ICJ deemed it
appropriate to examine the broader operational context in which the U.S. strikes took place, it is unclear
why it simultaneously excluded from its analysis the broader operational context of that defensive
operation, namely, the Iran-Iraq Tanker War and the consequent threat to neutral vessels in the Persian
Gulf.
243. See id. at 198. Because the Court only looked to the jus ad bellum in Oil Platforms in the
context of the U.S.-Iran Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty (FCN), it also failed to
distinguish clearly between (1) necessity as a part of the jus ad bellum; and (2) necessity as an
interpretation of the FCN’s textual exemption of conduct deemed “necessary” by the states parties to the
FCN to protect their security interests. See id. at 182. Judge Higgins pointed out, with considerable
force, that it is ill advised for the Court to examine the jus ad bellum “through the eye of a needle that is
the freedom of commerce clause of a 1955 FCN Treaty.” Id. at 231-32 (separate opinion of Judge
Higgins); see also id. at 291-93 (dissenting opinion of Judge Elaraby).
244. The Court thus implicitly adopted Iran’s view that “once an attack is over, as was the case
here, there is no need to repel it, and any counter-force no longer constitutes self-defence. Instead it is an
unlawful armed reprisal or a punitive action.” Reply and Defense to Counter-Claim of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, at 176, Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. 161, available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/90/8630.pdf.
245. See Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 198-99; see also id. at 333-34 (separate opinion of Judge
Simma). Judge Simma makes this explicit, stressing that, in his view, under the Nicaragua doctrine of
“proportionate countermeasures,” it would have been lawful for the United States to counter the Iranian
attacks “immediately” with “defensive measures designed to eliminate the specific source of the threat
or harm to affected ships in, and at the time of, the specific incidents.” Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
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needless and disproportionate, it seems “that a state which has been the object
of an illegal attack can never take the initiative or that its forces may only fire
if fired upon.”246
Oil Platforms may thus be understood as a variation on the “just war”
syllogism set out earlier: if no force may lawfully be used against a target,
then how can any particular quantum of force be necessary or proportionate?
Again, the defect here is not of logic but experience. Because the collective
security machinery of the Charter remains largely dysfunctional even in the
post-Cold War era, and a fortiori in the post-9/11 era, states invoke, and will
foreseeably continue to invoke, self-defense to justify resort to force. Just as
the dualistic axiom insists that legal and illegal force alike comply with the jus
in bello, including its proportionality constraint, so too should legal and illegal
force alike be required to comply with ad bellum proportionality. Otherwise,
this theoretically distinct constraint on force collapses back into the initial
judgment about the lawfulness of that force, degrading the efficacy of the jus
ad bellum as a whole. States may well be influenced to mitigate the amount or
manner of force applied to a target. But seldom if ever will they relinquish the
right to resort to force altogether in circumstances of perceived self-defense or
national security.
4.

Armed Activities

Armed Activities, probably the most significant recent decision on the
law of war, reflects the same misguided view. In it, the ICJ declined to
determine the jus ad bellum applicable to a chaotic, multiparty civil war that
had spilled over the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
and threatened the national security of adjacent states, including Uganda. It
instead assimilated the facts to a traditional interstate conflict and applied the
incongruous Nicaragua framework. Judge Kooijmans accurately critiqued the
majority’s analysis, stressing that it
inadequately reflects the structural instability and insecurity in the region, the overall
pattern of lawlessness and disorder and the reprehensible behaviour of all parties
involved. A reading of the Judgement cannot fail to leave the impression that the dispute
is first and foremost a dispute between two neighbouring States about the use of force
and the ensuing excesses, perpetrated by one of them. A two-dimensional picture may
correctly depict the object shown but it lacks depth and therefore does not reflect reality
in full.247

In particular, Uganda had intervened in the eastern region of the DRC based
on the perceived threats to its national security set forth in the “Safe Haven”
document promulgated by the Ugandan High Command.248 It asserted a need,
among other ad bellum goals, (1) to “neutralize . . . Uganda[n] dissident
groups which have been receiving assistance from the Government of the
DRC and the Sudan”; and (2) “[t]o prevent the genocidal elements, namely,
the Interahamwe and ex-FAR, which have been launching attacks on the
246. Greenwood, supra note 11, at 223.
247. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J.
116 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 14).
248. Id. para. 109 (majority opinion).
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people of Uganda . . . from continuing to do so.”249 Just as the United States
did not, despite Nicaragua and its progeny, refrain from attacking Afghanistan
given that the Taliban regime hosted nonstate actors that had attacked the
United States repeatedly, neither could Uganda reasonably be expected to
allow hostile nonstate belligerents to operate against it from within chaotic
regions of the eastern DRC—nonstate belligerents which Kabila’s
dysfunctional government proved either unable or unwilling to control.
Still, citing Nicaragua, the ICJ insisted that Uganda could not avail itself
of the right to self-defense.250 Tellingly, it considered in this regard only “one
of the five listed objectives” of Operation Safe Haven because only one, in its
view, “refer[red] to a response to acts that had already taken place.”251 Now,
in part, it seems likely that the ICJ did not want to opine on, still less be
perceived to validate, either anticipatory or preventive self-defense in light of
the U.S. assertion of the latter right in its 2002 National Security Strategy.252
But the ICJ thereby, as Judge Kooijmans observed, elided the critical issues in
Armed Activities and “missed a chance to fine-tune the position it took 20
years ago in spite of the explicit invitation by one of the Parties to do so.”253 It
absolved itself of its paramount obligation as the judicial organ of the United
Nations: to answer the questions of international law raised by disputes
submitted to it consensually by states—in this case, questions about how the
Charter’s jus ad bellum applies to “large-scale attacks by irregular forces.”254
Judge Simma, too, lamented this missed opportunity.255 He noted that “a
restrictive reading of Article 51 might well have reflected the state, or rather
the prevailing interpretation, of the international law of self-defence for a
long time,” but that “in the light of more recent developments not only in
State practice but also with regard to accompanying opinio juris, it ought
urgently to be reconsidered.”256 Furthermore, as in Oil Platforms, the Court
declined to consider how ad bellum proportionality applied once it found
unlawful Uganda’s initial resort to force. 257 At least tacitly, the majority
reasoned that its initial finding of ad bellum illegality obviated the need to
examine issues of ad bellum proportionality: again, no force, by this
misguided logic, can be ad bellum proportionate if force may not be deployed
in the first place.258 Armed Activities, like Oil Platforms, degrades the efficacy
249. Id.
250. See id. paras. 142-47.
251. Id. para. 143.
252. See THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
253. 2005 I.C.J. 116 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 25).
254. Id. para. 147).
255. See id. (separate opinion of Judge Simma, paras. 8-15).
256. See id. para. 11 (emphasis added).
257. See id. (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, paras. 31-33) (critiquing the Court for its
failure to examine necessity and proportionality in this regard and concluding that some Ugandan
military action should be deemed both necessary and proportionate, even though Uganda subsequently
violated these ad bellum conditions).
258. That said, the Court did, appropriately, proceed to consider the DRC’s allegations of in
bello violations by Ugandan forces. But it nonetheless failed to apply the dualistic axiom correctly, both
because it neglected to consider in bello proportionality and because it intimated that the legality vel non
of Uganda’s “belligerent occupation” of part of the DRC changed the applicable jus in bello. See id.
paras. 60-61 (majority opinion).
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of the jus ad bellum: Uganda might mitigate the manner or quantum of force it
applies, but it is extremely unlikely to relinquish its right to self-defense if it
perceives, rightly or not, a threat to its national security. Offering guidance on
ad bellum regulatory strategies like proportionality, rather than simply
condemning force as unlawful under the anachronistic Nicaragua framework,
therefore might well increase the efficacy of the modern law of war.
5.

The Wall

The ICJ’s advisory opinion in The Wall illustrates the point. 259 The
Court’s bottom line—that the wall built by Israel in the Occupied Territories
violates its obligations under both IHL and international human rights law—
strikes me as accurate.260 Israeli settlements in the West Bank violate, inter
alia, Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.261 But because of Israel’s
decision not to participate in the advisory proceedings, and because of the
Court’s failure to conduct an independent, impartial investigation for itself (or
even to solicit additional evidence), the majority manifestly lacked “the
requisite factual bases for its sweeping findings.”262 Even assuming, as Judge
Buergenthal stressed,
that on a thorough analysis of all the relevant facts, a finding could well be made that
some or even all segments of the wall . . . violate international law . . . . [T]o reach that
conclusion with regard to the wall as a whole without having before it or seeking to
ascertain all relevant facts bearing directly on issues of Israel’s legitimate right of selfdefence, military necessity and security needs, given the repeated deadly terrorist attacks
in and upon Israel proper coming from the Occupied Palestinian Territory to which Israel
has been and continues to be subjected, cannot be justified as a matter of law. . . . In my
view, the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people would have been better served
had the Court taken these considerations into account, for that would have given the
Opinion the credibility I believe it lacks.263

In fact, the majority opinion lacks not only credibility but analytic clarity
relative to the proper analysis of the law of war. The result is, as Judge
Buergenthal emphasizes, a disservice to the humanitarian objectives that the
majority purports to vindicate.
Assume the Court correctly found that Israel cannot assert a right of selfdefense in this context and that the wall as such therefore violates the
259. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
260. Id. at 201.
261. Id. at 182-84.
262. Id. at 240 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal). To decide the validity of Israel’s security
claims, the Court relied on little more than a report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and a
statement Israel submitted “limited to issues of jurisdiction and judicial propriety,” although the Court
said it included “observations on other matters,” including Israel’s security concerns. Id. at 162; see also
id. at 243-44 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal) (noting that the Court “fails to address any facts or
evidence specifically rebutting Israel’s claim of military exigencies or requirements of national security”
and “barely addresses the summaries of Israel’s position on this subject that are attached to the
Secretary-General’s report and which contradict or cast doubt on the material the Court claims to rely
on”). It would have been advisable, in my judgment, for the ICJ not to hear the case as a matter of its
discretion. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 28-29 (Oct. 16); Status of Eastern
Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, at 28-29 (July 23); see also 2004 I.C.J. at 20711 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
263. 2004 I.C.J. at 240-41 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal) (emphasis added).
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Charter’s jus ad bellum.264 The dualistic axiom should be understood to insist
that this conclusion is irrelevant to Israel’s duty to respect (1) ad bellum
necessity and proportionality; and (2) the jus in bello in its entirety, including
in bello proportionality.265 The ICJ failed to examine either issue. Instead, its
analysis essentially ceased after it condemned the wall as unlawful force. It
thereafter supplied little more than a conclusory litany of various treaty
provisions that it said the wall violated.
It is not that the ICJ necessarily erred in finding the wall unlawful (or in
violation of these treaties); it is that, even so, the dualistic axiom should have
led the Court to offer guidance on ad bellum and in bello law beyond merely
condemning illegal force. Instead, the ICJ effectively allowed its conclusion
that Israel lacked the right to self-defense to obviate the need for this analysis.
Whatever the ad bellum legality of the wall as a measure of self-defense, for
example, the dualistic axiom requires an independent in bello proportionality
analysis—that is, an analysis of the extent to which the wall may be “expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.”266 The Court (lacking evidence on this
issue) simply neglected it. In fact, The Wall may be seen as an extreme
version of denying the analytic independence of ad bellum and in bello
judgments: it suggests that the former not only affect but determine the latter.
Relative to in bello proportionality, the Court, without evidentiary analysis,
offered only the ipse dixit that it
is not convinced that the specific course Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to
attain its security objectives. The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated régime
gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by
Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military
exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order.267

But absent a bona fide appraisal of Israel’s avowed security needs or claims of
military exigency, this conclusion rings hollow: “[t]he Court says that it ‘is
not convinced’ but it fails to demonstrate why it is not convinced, and that is
264. I seriously doubt this conclusion. The wall, like the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba during
the Cuban Missile Crisis, is a weapon—a defensive weapon, to be sure, but a weapon. Its lawfulness as
self-defense depends on whether Israel has been the victim of an “armed attack.” U.N. Charter art. 51;
cf. Schachter, supra note 28, at 134. The Court cursorily dismisses this possibility in a single paragraph,
unsupported by authority, in which it claims that Article 51 only permits self-defense in response to the
“armed attack by one State against another State,” 2004 I.C.J. at 194. But see Schachter, supra note 29,
at 311. The Court also claims that the right of self-defense does not apply against threats that originate
from within a state’s territory. 2004 I.C.J. at 194. The first proposition is doubtful: the text of Article 51
contains no such limitation, and its imposition is in tension with recent resolutions of the Security
Council. See id. at 242 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); id. at 215 (separate opinion of Judge
Higgins); id. at 229-30 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans). The second proposition is equally
doubtful: states retain the right to respond in self-defense to insurgencies within their own territory,
provided their response is necessary and proportionate and otherwise complies with international law.
Id. at 215 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). The Court also contradicts itself by ignoring the essential
(and accurate) premise of the remainder of its opinion: that the Occupied Territories do not constitute
Israeli territory under international law. See id. at 166-67.
265. See Sassòli, supra note 11, at 251-52.
266. Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 51(5)(b) (emphasis added).
267. 2004 I.C.J. at 193.

2009]

The Cost of Conflation

89

why these conclusions are not convincing.” 268 A more credible and
sophisticated analysis would have sought and considered evidence bearing on
the asserted military exigency carefully, even assuming the wall were
unlawful, 269 and then opined on proportionality relative to “individual
segments of its route.”270
The ICJ’s tacit justification for disregarding the dualistic axiom in The
Wall seems to be the view criticized by Lauterpacht more than fifty years ago:
that any effort to offer guidance on the conduct of hostilities in the context of
unlawful force might confer a veneer of legitimacy on that force. This is
misguided, for “[i]t is not the existence of rules for the conduct of war which
causes states to resort to force but more fundamental factors in international
relations.”271 The foregoing logic is also counterproductive. Unsurprisingly,
and as experience since The Wall attests, Israel will not accept (nor would any
state) the Court’s cavalier dismissal of its national security interests. Nor will
it obey an order to dismantle the wall forthwith. That does not mean the ICJ
should refrain from declaring a situation unlawful or issuing an appropriate
remedy because it anticipates disobedience; only that it should not allow this
initial finding to obviate the need for further legal analysis. It is not
unreasonable to believe that had the ICJ made its views on proportionality
available, Israel would have considered them.
This is not speculation: Israeli decisions suggest the same. In Beit Sourik
Village Council v. Israel,272 and Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel,273 the
Israeli Supreme Court considered the complex, fact-intensive judgments about
in bello proportionality raised by the wall (or security fence). Based on a
sophisticated in bello analysis, it ordered parts dismantled, other parts
modified to take less injurious routes, and changes to Israeli law. These
orders, backed by effective domestic institutions of enforcement, did much
more to ameliorate the injuries to Palestinians than did the ICJ’s opinion,
which simply declared the wall unlawful and then neglected the hard
questions about in bello proportionality. This is not to suggest that the Israeli
Supreme Court necessarily gave the right answer on each issue. But its
willingness to work out a concrete theory of in bello proportionality and to
apply it to the factually complex, politically sensitive circumstances of the
conflict contributed far more to IHL’s objectives than the ICJ’s categorical
declaration and elision of the dualistic axiom.
True, the ICJ has a limited capacity for factfinding and a distinct
institutional role within the international system. It would be misguided to
suggest that the Court could, or should, have undertaken an analysis
268. Id. at 244 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Greenwood, supra note 11, at 233.
272. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807; see also Sarah
Williams, Has International Law Hit the Wall? An Analysis of International Law in Relation to Israel’s
Separation Barrier, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192 (2006).
273. HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 58(2) 393; see also Victor
Kattan, The Legality of the West Bank Wall: Israel’s High Court of Justice v. the International Court of
Justice, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1425 (2007); Geoffrey R. Watson, International Decision:
Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 895 (2006).
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comparable in specificity or approach to that contained in the Israeli decisions.
But had it rigorously analyzed the jus in bello after finding the wall unlawful,
Beit Sourik and Mara’abe suggest that its judgment would have been
considered seriously by the Israeli courts. By declining to engage difficult in
bello issues, the ICJ failed to offer guidance to a state whose judiciary has
historically treated international law seriously. Because domestic
incorporation and internalization is one of the most effective means by which
international law is enforced, 274 the ICJ’s approach in The Wall seems not
only misguided but counterproductive. It did little but weaken the ICJ’s
credibility and authority for the future. The Wall’s failure to analyze the facts
rigorously or to consider Israel’s claims of military necessity diminishes the
decision’s force. Outside the politically charged context of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, one may be sure that states, relative to themselves, will
not heed a judgment that dismisses the relevance of their national security
interests.
The Wall also took the misguided logic of Oil Platforms one step further.
In Oil Platforms, the Court found the U.S. attacks unjustified under the U.N.
Charter and then collapsed ad bellum necessity and proportionality into its
initial judgment that the U.S. strikes violated Article 51. In The Wall, the
Court collapsed both ad bellum and in bello proportionality into its dubious
conclusion about the scope of Article 51: that self-defense may only be
invoked against states. Despite its significance, this issue occupied a single
paragraph in the opinion.275 By blurring the ad bellum-in bello distinction, the
Court forwent an opportunity to shape international law, to influence state
behavior, and perhaps to reduce superfluous suffering in war, the paramount
objective of modern IHL.
6.

Nuclear Weapons

In its advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons, the consequences of the
ICJ’s myopic focus on regulating the contingencies for resort to self-defense
in the first instance rather than on the more difficult issues of ad bellum and in
bello law led to a holding that most regard as, at best, confused. The General
Assembly had asked the ICJ to advise it whether “the threat or use of nuclear
weapons [is] in any circumstances permitted under international law.”276 After
dismissing certain nondispositive alternative arguments, the ICJ turned to “the
most directly relevant applicable law”: the law “relating to the use of force
enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the law applicable in armed
conflict which regulates the conduct of hostilities.”277 It suggested, that is, that
both ad bellum and in bello law bear on the legality of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons.

274. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2645-58 (1997).
275. 2004 I.C.J. at 194.
276. G.A. Res. 49/75K, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/75K (Dec. 15, 1994).
277. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
243 (July 8).
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The ICJ opined that although the unique characteristics of nuclear
weapons, including their awesome destructiveness and inherent inability to
respect the principle of distinction, “seem[] scarcely reconcilable with” the jus
in bello, it lacked “sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty
that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the
principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any
circumstance.”278 In part, the Court may have had in mind the hypothetical
circumstances posed by Judge Schwebel in dissent, for example, the tactical
use of a nuclear depth charge to disable a nuclear-armed submarine known to
be planning a direct attack on a city in the target state. 279 Yet the ICJ’s
Delphic and controversial 7-7 holding, broken by its president, suggests
another possibility. The Court notoriously held that while
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law; . . . [it] cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of selfdefence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.280

The former sentence, it seems, declares nuclear weapons “generally” illegal
under the jus in bello (except, perhaps, in unlikely scenarios such as those
suggested by Judge Schwebel).281 The latter proposes that nuclear weapons
might still be lawful given high enough stakes. As Judges Higgins and
Schwebel alike stressed, this de facto non liquet holding is breathtaking:282 no
state had even argued that a use of nuclear weapons that violates the jus in
bello may become lawful if it satisfies the jus ad bellum.283 If this reading is
accurate, the ICJ’s holding clearly violates the dualistic axiom, for the jus in
bello does not, in this view, apply uniformly to all parties. Rather, the state
acting in an “extreme circumstance of self-defence . . . in which [its] very
survival . . . would be at stake” apparently may use weapons that would be
legally prohibited were they deployed by its adversary.284
278. Id. at 262-63.
279. Id. at 320-21 (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel).
280. Id. at 266.
281. But see id. at 367 (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins) (finding the use of the word
“generally” ambiguous).
282. See id. at 322 (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel); id. at 368-69 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Higgins). The ICJ’s non liquet holding may reflect “the central dilemma of contemporary
international law,” i.e., “the place of the state in a system that simultaneously recognizes the state as the
source of its norms and interprets those norms in a transnational, principled fashion. . . . Survival of the
sovereign state can appear to be as much a first principle of an international moral order as justice,
peace, or human rights.” Paul W. Kahn, Nuclear Weapons and the Rule of Law, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 349, 373 (1999). Yet contemporary, in contrast to classical, international law sees sovereignty as a
value contingent on the actual, rather than speculative, sociopolitical life and national culture of the
people in which it, theoretically, now resides. E.g., Luban, Just War and Human Rights, supra note 35,
at 204 (distinguishing nations, which possess moral rights derived from their constituents, from states,
which do not); Reisman, supra note 40, at 869 (distinguishing the locus of sovereignty in classical
versus contemporary international law). To regard the survival of states as a first-order moral principle
that trumps human dignity and concrete human rights mistakenly presumes a contingent value for an
abstraction that is inaccurate for many, perhaps most, contemporary states and should not, at any rate, be
the basis for a universal rule of contemporary international law.
283. 1996 I.C.J. at 590 (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins).
284. DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 161 (quoting Shabtai Rosenne, The Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinions of 8 July 1996, 27 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 263, 296 (1997)).
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Another plausible reading, however, is that the ICJ rejected the dualistic
axiom in an even deeper sense. Note that it related Article 51 to what it
described as “the fundamental right of every State to survival, and thus its
right to resort to self-defence . . . when its survival is at stake.” 285 This
suggests that the Court may not have intended to imply that force that violates
the jus in bello might still be legal if it satisfies the jus ad bellum. Rather, as
suggested earlier, the Court may have had in mind scenarios that political
theorists refer to as supreme emergencies. If so, the ICJ arguably meant that
where “the very survival of a State would be at stake,”286 nuclear weapons
would not violate in bello proportionality at all because of the peculiar logic
of supreme emergency theory, which elevates states to or well beyond the
moral status of persons. The jus in bello, that is, ceases to be as relevant, or
relevant at all, if “the fundamental right of [a] State to survival”287 is at stake.
Needless to say, a right of states to survive does not appear in the U.N.
Charter or other positive law. Consistent with the logic of supreme
emergency, it rather seems to be an assertion about an allegedly inherent right
of states, which derives from their presumed associative value. On this view,
states, like individuals in Hobbes’s state of nature, have a natural right to selfdefense and survival that cannot be relinquished. If this reading is correct,
Nuclear Weapons involves a frequent, but always questionable and often
dangerously anachronistic, argument: that states may coherently be analogized
to people and that they necessarily enjoy an equal or greater moral status in
international law.
On either view, the ICJ’s opinion has disquieting implications beyond
the unique horror of nuclear weapons. There is no principled reason to limit its
logic to particular weapons or methods of warfare. Chemical or biological
weapons, too, would be justified to ensure a state’s survival, as would torture,
summary execution, terrorism, denial of quarter, and other in bello
violations—provided only that the cost of military defeat in ad bellum terms
reaches a sufficient level, that is, the destruction of a state or (perhaps) a
cognate nonstate polity. A core purpose of the dualistic axiom is to avoid this
kind of misguided logic. Taken to its extreme, it leads inexorably to the
destruction of independent constraints on the use of force by polities. Such
entities may, in this view, arrogate to themselves an associative value that
exceeds the aggregate interests of their constituents. Even apart from general
philosophical objections, one obvious problem with this contention in the
context of international law is that it cannot be limited in principle to the
survival of “desirable” polities—say, to liberal democratic states.288 States like
North Korea may equally invoke this sort of logic to justify IHL violations
and disregard the dualistic axiom—as may nonstate collectives, such as alQaeda, that espouse some collective, sacred value higher than the individual.

285. 1996 I.C.J. at 263 (emphasis added).
286. Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
287. Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
288. Cf. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 191, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (“Allowing one to so act is to allow all.”).

2009]

The Cost of Conflation
7.

93

Conclusion

From its inception, the ICJ has focused almost exclusively on preserving
its restrictive reading of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter in its jurisprudence of
war. In part as a result, it has paid little attention to working out the concrete
contours of the distinct requirements of ad bellum and in bello proportionality.
It has effectively reasoned, in the spirit of the just war syllogism explored
earlier, that where a state, in its view, violates Article 51 because the armed
attack threshold established in Nicaragua has not been met, no quantum of
force can qualify as ad bellum necessary or proportionate. Nor, according to
The Wall’s logic, is it necessary to examine in bello proportionality once it has
been determined that a state had no right to resort to force in the first instance.
This jurisprudence tends to degrade the efficacy of ad bellum and in bello
proportionality as distinct and independent constraints on force. It treats
(arguable) violations of Article 51 as sufficient to obviate the need for a more
in-depth legal analysis. Most disturbing, according to the logic of Nuclear
Weapons, ad bellum goals that presuppose the associative value of polities qua
polities, like the “very survival of a State,” apparently may supersede in bello
requirements, even of an absolute nature, authorizing tactics that IHL
absolutely prohibits.
B.

Conflation in State Practice

The ICJ’s decisions do not necessarily offer the best indicia of the actual
state of international law or practice. Yet recent state practice also suggests
how failure to apply the dualistic axiom may affect the conduct of hostilities.
Below, I briefly examine three examples: (1) NATO’s 1999 air campaign
against Serbia in an avowed effort to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo; (2)
the brief but tragic conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in the
summer of 2006, which, for lack of a common name, I refer to as the ThirtyFour Day War; and (3) the resurrection of candidly justified torture as a tactic
of war.289
1.

Kosovo

In March 1999, Serbian forces launched attacks on the Kosovo
Liberation Army and targeted ethnic Albanian civilians. 290 In response,
NATO organized air strikes against Serbian targets, flying more than 38,000

289. The practice of torture did not cease despite the emergence of international human rights
law prohibiting it in all circumstances and a general consensus that its prohibition is now jus cogens. See
Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmts. b & k (1987). What is new is the candid acknowledgment of
torture and efforts to justify it within the framework of IHL or otherwise.
290. See generally Hearing on Kosovo After-Action Review Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm.,
106th Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of William S. Cohen, Sec’y of Defense, & Gen. Henry H. Shelton,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test99-1014CohenShelton.pdf.
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sorties over the course of the conflict.291 A ground invasion might well have
been more effective and efficient and, as relevant here, might have better
enabled NATO to distinguish between civilians and combatants. The aerial
war, according to most analysts, took more time than a ground war, killed or
injured more civilians, and caused more damage to Serbia’s civilian
infrastructure, 292 not to mention accidents like the bombing of the Chinese
Embassy.293
NATO members chose to carry out the war solely by air, however,
because their political elites believed their domestic constituents would not
tolerate casualties. And to minimize the risk to pilots from Serbian antiaircraft defenses, NATO planes flew at a minimum height of 15,000 feet.294
After some strikes mistakenly killed civilians, including refugees, NATO’s in
bello conduct came under intensified scrutiny.295 Critics argued that NATO
could have averted these mistakes with better target-sighting techniques, in
particular, visual confirmation (either by pilots flying at lower altitudes or by
ground troops confirming target selection).296 This criticism intensified when
the war did not end as quickly as NATO had anticipated. As the campaign’s
success seemed less certain and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević refused
to relent promptly, the issue of potential ground troop deployment gained
renewed attention.297 NATO never sent troops into Kosovo, however, because
of both the difficulty of achieving supranational consensus298 and the expected
domestic political opposition to any military action that would risk
casualties.299
On June 10, 1999, after nearly four months, the conflict ended. Total
civilian casualties numbered around five hundred,300 and Serbia had sustained
severe damage to its civilian infrastructure. These facts, among others,

291. Hearing Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. 3 (1999) (statement of Gen.
Wesley Clark, Admiral James Ellis, Jr. & Lt. Gen. Michael Short), available at
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test99-10-21Clark.pdf.
292. See, e.g., Tania Voon, Pointing the Finger: Civilian Casualties of NATO Bombing in the
Kosovo Conflict, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1083, 1096-113 (2001).
293. Id. at 1108-10.
294. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (ICTY): FINAL
REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (June 8, 2000), reprinted in 39 I.L.M.
1257, 1273 (2000) [hereinafter ICTY REPORT]; see also Olivera Medenica, Protocol I and Operation
Allied Force: Did NATO Abide by Principles of Proportionality?, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
329, 406 (2001).
295. ICTY REPORT, supra note 294, at 1257-58.
296. See, e.g., Medenica, supra note 294, at 406-09.
297. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt & Michael R. Gordon, British Pressing Partners To Deploy
Ground Troops, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1999, at A10.
298. See Jane Perlez, Clinton and the Joint Chiefs To Discuss Ground Invasion, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 1999, at A14.
299. Blaine Harden & John M. Broder, Clinton’s Aims: Win the War, Keep the U.S. Voters
Content, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1999, at A1. In fact, the polls were less conclusive on this point than
commonly thought. Andrew Kohut, Beware of Polls on the War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1999, at A27; see
Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey K. Walker, Thomas P. Keenan Memorial Lecture: The Demise of the NationState, the Dawn of New Paradigm Warfare, and a Future for the Profession of Arms, 51 A.F. L. REV.
323, 335 (2001).
300. ICTY REPORT, supra note 294, at 1272 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS
IN THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN (2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato).
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weakened popular support for NATO’s conduct 301 and motivated various
organizations to appraise the legality of NATO’s tactics ex post.302 Multiple
parties even requested that ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte investigate
NATO for war crimes,303 although she found a full investigation unwarranted
based on a report prepared by a committee established to review NATO’s in
bello conduct. 304 The Prosecutor’s Report embraced the dualistic axiom. It
rejected any notion “that the ‘bad’ side had to comply with the law while the
‘good’ side could violate it at will” and based this view on the usual rationale
that a legal asymmetry “would be most unlikely to reduce human suffering in
conflict.” 305 The Report also acknowledged that military commanders are
obliged:
a) to do everything practicable to verify that the objectives to be attacked are military
objectives,
b) to take all practicable precautions in the choice of methods and means of warfare with
a view to avoiding or, in any event to minimizing incidental civilian casualties or civilian
property damage, and
c) to refrain from launching attacks which may be expected to cause disproportionate
civilian casualties or civilian property damage.306

Now, “everything practicable” does not mean “everything.” But it is
unclear whether the Report held NATO to the former standard. Its analysis of
in bello proportionality elides the question whether NATO acted lawfully by
focusing on an alleged lack of clarity in IHL.307 Even though, it says, “NATO
air commanders have a duty to take practicable measures to distinguish
military objectives from civilians or civilian objectives,” and even though they
deliberately avoided any risk to NATO combatants by flying at an altitude that
“meant the target could not be verified with the naked eye,” still, “it appears
that with the use of modern technology, the obligation to distinguish was
effectively carried out in the vast majority of cases during the bombing
campaign.” 308 Furthermore, the Report says, “there is nothing inherently
unlawful about flying above the height which can be reached by enemy air
defenses.”309
These conclusions may be right, yet many commentators have
concluded otherwise.310 And apart from strict questions of legality, NATO’s
tactics “sent a message that could hardly be lost on the world: that Americans
301. Jane Perlez, 3 Options for Washington, All With Major Risks, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1999,
at A12.
302. E.g., AMNESTY INT’L, NATO/FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: “COLLATERAL
DAMAGE” OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS? VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY NATO DURING OPERATION
ALLIED FORCE (2000), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR70/018/2000/en.
303. ICTY REPORT, supra note 294, at 1257-58.
304. Voon, supra note 292, at 1086-87.
305. ICTY REPORT, supra note 294, at 1266.
306. Id. at 1265.
307. Id. at 1271. But see Anthony J. Colangelo, Manipulating International Criminal
Procedure: The Decision of the ICTY Office of the Independent Prosecutor Not To Investigate NATO
Bombing in the Former Yugoslavia, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1393, 1424 (2003) (concluding, based on an
analysis of the incidents and allegations, that “the international law is clear and that the [Report] failed
to accurately apply that law”).
308. ICTY REPORT, supra note 294, at 1273.
309. See id. But see Colangelo, supra note 307, at 1424.
310. See, e.g., Medenica, supra note 294, at 393, 408; Voon, supra note 292.
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considered one American life to be worth thousands of Yugoslav lives—
hardly a resounding endorsement of the doctrine of universal human
rights.”311 Of course, even if NATO violated IHL at the margins and deployed
questionable tactics from a policy perspective, it is clearly a distinct question
whether it would be appropriate to prosecute NATO combatants for war
crimes given the nature of the alleged violations.312 Arguable violations of in
bello proportionality by NATO at the margins do not compare to the
deliberate targeting of civilians, still less to the kind of serious atrocities on
which the Tribunal has properly focused: extrajudicial killing, rape, torture,
ethnic cleansing, and the like. But an impartial review of the Report would at
a minimum leave some doubt in the reviewer’s mind as to whether NATO’s
ad bellum justification for the air strikes did not affect its conclusions about
the legality of NATO’s in bello conduct.
NATO engaged in a four-month campaign of brutal air strikes against
Serbia, deploying fighter planes at heights that reduced the risk to its own
combatants to zero at the cost of a substantial increase in the risk to Serbia’s
civilians.313 Beyond more than five hundred civilian deaths, Serbian civilians
suffered horrible injuries, and its economy and infrastructure sustained severe
damage from which it still has not fully recovered. Had the avowed goal of
the air strikes been to annex Kosovo or to further—rather than to halt—ethnic
cleansing,314 would the Report have been so quick to dismiss allegations that
NATO violated in bello proportionality? Concededly, we can only speculate.
But many organizations and analysts have suggested it would not have been. I
endorse NATO’s action under the circumstances. But we should acknowledge
that NATO’s avowed ad bellum goal, which some described as legitimate
even if not lawful, arguably influenced its in bello conduct.
2.

The Thirty-Four Day War

On July 12, 2006, a Hezbollah attack on the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) rapidly escalated into a thirty-four day conflict,315 ending in a U.N.brokered ceasefire.316 Both Israel and Hezbollah attacked dual-use targets and
civilian areas during the war, killing, injuring, and displacing civilians. 317
311. David Luban, Intervention and Civilization, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND TRANSNATIONAL
POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 79, 82 (Pablo De
Greiff & Ciaran Cronin eds., 2002).
312. See Colangelo, supra note 307, at 1436; see also Human Rights Watch, The Milosevic
Case: Questions and Answers, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/08/29/serbia1819.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2008) (concluding that even though certain incidents in the NATO campaign “violated the laws of
war,” they “did not . . . rise to the more serious level of ‘grave breaches’ or war crimes that the tribunal
is empowered to prosecute”).
313. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 302.
314. On NATO’s objectives, see Christine M. Chinkin, Comment, Kosovo: A “Good” or
“Bad” War?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 841, 841 n.2 (1999). But see Michael Mccgwire, Why Did We Bomb
Belgrade?, 76 INT’L AFF. 1 (2000).
315. The conflict began around 8 A.M. local time on July 12, 2006, and ended in a cease-fire at
8 A.M. on August 14, 2006. In terms of twenty-four-hour periods, the conflict continued for thirty-three
days, but it encompassed thirty-four calendar days.
316. See S.C. Res. 1701, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006).
317. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN LEBANON
DURING THE 2006 WAR 4 (2007), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2007/lebanon0907. Both parties
also at times used indiscriminate weapons such as cluster munitions. Id. at 11-12.
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Israel, for example, attacked Beirut’s airport, media transmission stations, and
transportation routes.318 Its attack on Qana killed scores of civilians.319 In its
defense, Israel emphasized that Hezbollah intentionally used these civilian
areas for military operations and turned civilians into “human shields.” 320
Both sides engaged in retaliatory rhetoric and suggested that in bello
violations perpetrated by their forces could be justified as reprisals. Sheik
Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, said that “[a]s long as the enemy acts without
limitations or red lines, it’s our right to continue the confrontation without
limits.” 321 At one point, Israeli U.N. Ambassador Gillerman, responding to
allegations that Israel was using disproportionate force, replied, “You’re damn
right we are.”322
Israel appealed to the nature of Hezbollah to justify its strikes in civilian
areas. It appealed, that is, to an ad bellum consideration (the nature of the
enemy) to justify prima facie in bello violations. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni
argued that “[p]roportionality is not compared to the event, but to the threat,
and the threat is bigger and wider than the captured soldiers. Unfortunately,
civilians sometimes pay the price of giving shelter to terrorists.” 323 In a
Security Council meeting, Gillerman apologized for the civilian deaths but
stressed the “huge moral disequivalence between the two sides,” for “[w]hile
our enemies . . . specifically target women and children . . . , we are defending
ourselves in this brutal war.”324
Both of the preceding statements mix in bello considerations (the
principle of distinction, civilians) with ad bellum ones (self-defense, the
nature of the threat). 325 While the IDF and Hezbollah alike seem to have
violated IHL,326 for present purposes, the point of emphasis lies less in those
318. AMNESTY INT’L, ISRAEL/LEBANON: DELIBERATE DESTRUCTION OR “COLLATERAL
DAMAGE”? ISRAELI ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE (2006), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE18/007/2006/en/dom-MDE180072006en.pdf.
319. President of the Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council
Delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/35 (July 30, 2006). Israel argued that it had
warned civilians to leave the area. U.N. Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly
Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council”, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/7
(Oct. 2, 2006) (prepared by Philip Alston et al.) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Council,
Implementation].
320. U.N. Human Rights Council, Implementation, supra note 319, ¶¶ 68-71.
321. Jad Mouawad & Steven Erlanger, Israel Bombards Lebanon After Hezbollah Hits Haifa
with Missiles, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2006, at A1; see also U.N. Human Rights Council, Implementation,
supra note 319, ¶¶ 68-71.
322. Steve Erlanger, With Israeli Use of Force, Debate over Proportion, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2006, at A1; see also Greg Myre, Offering Video, Israel Answers Critics on War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2006, at A1.
323. Erlanger, supra note 322.
324. U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5498th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5498 (July 30, 2006) (emphasis
added).
325. Israel’s arguments in support of its actions also reflected the rhetoric of preventive selfdefense: that its goal was to deprive Hezbollah of its ability to conduct future strikes. See, e.g., Seymour
M. Hersh, Watching Lebanon: Washington’s Interests in Israel’s War, NEW YORKER, Aug. 21, 2006, at
28 (“[A] national-security adviser to the Knesset . . . told me, . . . ‘Hezbollah is armed to the teeth and
trained in the most advanced technology of guerilla warfare. It was just a matter of time. We had to
address it.’”).
326. U.N. Human Rights Council, Implementation, supra note 319, ¶¶ 99-100. Others reached
the same conclusion. E.g., Press Release, Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, High
Commissioner for Human Rights Condemns All Actions Targeting Civilians in Lebanon and Israel (July
20, 2006), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/press/newsFrameset-2.htm (follow “By Official”
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violations as such than it does in the failure of both the belligerents and their
critics to distinguish ad bellum from in bello violations. Cannizzaro notes that
critics frequently referred to the “disproportionate character of Israel’s
response” without clarifying “which kind of proportionality was being
referred to. Quite often the[] statements contain[ed] elements of both jus ad
bellum and jus in bello arguments.”327 In fact, the war raised distinct issues for
each of these bodies of law. One question is the ad bellum legality of Israel’s
resort to force and its ad bellum proportionality relative to the casus belli that,
for Israel, justified it. Another, which should be distinct, is the in bello
proportionality of particular strikes.
The immediate casus belli for Israel’s incursion into Lebanon was
Hezbollah’s attack with Katyusha rockets and mortars launched from
Lebanese territory at IDF bases near the Israeli border town of Zarit. 328
Hezbollah used those attacks as a diversion. During them, it crossed the
border into Israel, attacked an IDF patrol, kidnapped two Israeli soldiers,
killed three, and wounded two.329 Israel responded with a rescue mission. An
attack by Hezbollah then claimed the lives of four of the Israeli soldiers
engaged in “hot pursuit.”330 Israel thus argued that Hezbollah’s attacks, in the
aggregate, justified its use of force in self-defense. Although an early (July 12)
Israeli Cabinet communiqué suggested that Israel would hold Lebanon
“responsible for the action that originated on its soil,”331 Israel soon modified
its asserted casus belli. A July 16 statement clarified that “Israel is not fighting
Lebanon but the terrorist element there, led by Nasrallah and his cohorts, who
have made Lebanon a hostage and created Syrian—and Iranian—sponsored
terrorist enclaves of murder.”332
Israel’s casus belli thus relied on the U.S. precedent of attacking
Afghanistan for harboring al-Qaeda during and after the attacks of 9/11—
except that scant evidence suggested that the government of Lebanon, unlike
the Taliban relative to al-Qaeda, actively supported Hezbollah. In fact, the
situation bore more resemblance to Uganda’s justification for its military
incursion into the DRC based on the inability of Kabila’s regime to control
forces hostile to Uganda in the eastern region of that vast state, which, like
Afghanistan, had been in the midst of a chaotic civil war. The ICJ, as noted,
hyperlink; then follow “High Commissioner/Deputy HC” hyperlink); Anthony D’Amato, War Crimes
and the Mideast Conflict, JURIST, July 24, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/Forumy/2006/07/war-crimesand-mideast-conflict.php.
327. Enzo Cannizzaro, Contextualizing Proportionality: Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello in the
Lebanese War, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 779, 781 (2006). Conflation of ad bellum and in bello
proportionality is not an uncommon feature of international legal and political discourse. See id.
328. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/2006/560 (July 21, 2006).
329. Victor Kattan, Israel, Hezbollah, and the Conflict in Lebanon: An Act of Aggression or
Self-Defense?, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 26 (2006).
330. Id.
331. Press Release, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Special Cabinet Communique—Hizbullah
Attack (July 12, 2006), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2006/
Special%20Cabinet%20Communique%20-%20Hizbullah%20attack%2012-Jul-2006; see also ISR.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ISRAEL’S WAR WITH HIZBULLAH 2 (2007).
332. Press Release, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cabinet Communique (July 16, 2006),
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2006/Cabinet%20Communique
%2016-Jul-2006.
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has not, despite explicit invitations, offered guidance on the jus ad bellum that
applies in this kind of increasingly common situation. Furthermore, beyond
the question whether Israel’s initial resort to force was ad bellum lawful, the
war raised deeply complex questions of ad bellum proportionality. Launching
a full-scale, transborder war in response to a relatively trivial attack by
Hezbollah initially seems manifestly disproportionate. And that would be an
accurate conclusion based on Nicaragua and its progeny. Yet is that a
plausible or realistic way to analyze the situation?
In Israel’s view, the kidnapping culminated a series of similar attacks
that should be properly analyzed, not as isolated, atomized incidents, but in
the aggregate.333 Livni thus emphasized that proportionality must be judged in
terms of the overall threat posed by Hezbollah, not “as an answer to a single
incident.” 334 John Bolton, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
offered a comparable defense of Israel’s resort to force. Responding to
allegations that Israel acted disproportionately, he remarked:
What Hezbollah has done is kidnap Israeli soldiers and rain rockets and mortar shells on
innocent Israeli civilians. What Israel has done in response is an act of self-defense. And
I don’t quite understand what the argument about proportionate force means here. Is
Israel entitled only to kidnap two Hezbollah operatives and fire a couple of rockets
aimlessly at Lebanon?335

Bolton’s remark, despite the rhetorical sarcasm, reflects a very real and
troubling gap in international law.
Proportionality, in both its in bello and ad bellum manifestations, is not,
as EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana said with reference to the in bello
law governing the Thirty-Four Day War, “a mathematical concept.”336 It is
clearly not calculated according to the archaic lex talionis principle. But few
seem to know how it should be calculated. Relative to the jus ad bellum,
Nicaragua and its progeny hold that a minor cross-border incursion does not
qualify as an armed attack sufficient to authorize self-defense. Yet in an era
characterized by internal conflicts between nonstate belligerents, terrorist
strikes emanating from states that prove unable or unwilling to control their
borders, and asymmetrical wars of attrition, is it realistic to suppose that states
will tolerate repeated “minor” attacks, which may amount to “death by a
thousand pinpricks”? At some point, a state will deem those attacks, in the
aggregate, an armed attack that justifies self-defense every bit as much as a
conventional attack by one state on another, the paradigm in the minds of the
U.N. Charter’s drafters. Some therefore argue that Israel’s initial resort to selfdefense in the Thirty-Four Day War can be justified given recent state
333. See, e.g., Press Release, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Behind the Headlines: The
Second Lebanon War—One Year Later, (July 12, 2007), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/The%20Second%20Lebanon%20War%20-%20One%20
year%20later%20-%20July%202007.
334. Herb Keinon, Israel Dismisses Assad Cease-Fire Call as ‘Bizarre’, JERUSALEM POST, July
20, 2006, at 1.
335. CNN.com, Bolton Defends Israel’s Actions in Lebanon, July 24, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/23/mideast.bolton/index.html.
336. Keinon, supra note 334. Israeli Foreign Minister Livni expressed this view in the ad
bellum context, while EU Foreign Policy Chief Solana expressed a comparable view relative to in bello
law. Yet neither these speakers nor the article reporting their comments distinguishes the two.
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practice, 337 even if the casus belli did not render ad bellum proportionate
particular strikes in Lebanon “beyond the territory controlled by
Hezbollah.”338
Israel defended its military response in terms redolent of the U.S. view
of ad bellum proportionality rejected by the ICJ in Oil Platforms: that it is ad
bellum proportionate, not only to respond in self-defense to the direct,
immediate source of an attack, during the duration of that attack, but also to
use defensive force in response to one attack as a means to deter like attacks
prospectively. In an interview conducted one year after the Thirty-Four Day
War, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert invoked the “need to restore
deterrence” to justify Israel’s resort to self-defense and said the war had
succeeded.339 He referred in this regard to Nasrallah’s widely reported view
that had Nasrallah known what would eventuate because of his decision to
order the kidnappings, “he wouldn’t have started the war.”340
Again, the point of emphasis is not whether the parties violated the jus
ad bellum or the jus in bello. Whatever one’s conclusions on these issues, the
Thirty-Four Day War evinces ad bellum-in bello conflation and, in particular,
widespread confusion about the meaning of each body of law’s distinct
proportionality component. Given geopolitical, military, and technological
change since 1945, the law of war can no longer afford to take the path of
least resistance adopted by the ICJ in the Armed Activities judgment handed
down one year before this tragedy in Lebanon. It can no longer afford to elide
the issue of how the jus ad bellum applies to unconventional scenarios—
which have, in reality, become far more common than “conventional” ones.
By neglecting them, the law not only fails to offer guidance or to influence the
conduct of participants in contemporary wars; it also facilitates abuses by
those participants—state and nonstate alike.
3.

The Resurrection of Rationalized Torture

In February 2008, Michael Hayden, Director General of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), acknowledged that the CIA had subjected three alQaeda detainees to waterboarding in 2002 and 2003,341 although he said that it
had not used waterboarding since then.342 The U.S. executive branch presently
refuses, however, to acknowledge that waterboarding is either illegal as such
or a form of torture. In fact, in a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S.
Attorney General Mukasey wrote that waterboarding might again be
authorized in the future, although
337. See, e.g., Tom Ruys, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: An Inquiry into Israel’s Recourse to
Self-Defense Against Hezbollah, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 265, 267 n.7 (2007) (collecting sources).
338. Id. at 292; Cannizzaro, supra note 327, at 780.
339. Press Release, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview with Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert on “Al Arabiya” (July 10, 2007), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/
Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2007/PM%20Olmert%20interviewed%20on%20al%20Arabia%2010-Jul2007.
340. Id.
341. Mark Mazzetti, Intelligence Chief Says Al Qaeda Improves Ability To Strike in U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008, at A1.
342. Id.; see also Scott Shane, Waterboarding Focus of Inquiry by Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2008, at A1.
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the CIA director would [first] have to . . . ask [the Attorney General] . . . if its use would
be lawful—taking into account the particular facts and circumstances at issue, including
how and why it is to be used, the limits of its use, and the safeguards that are in place for
its use.343

He added that in “some circumstances . . . current law would appear clearly to
prohibit waterboarding’s use. But other circumstances would present a far
closer question.”344 Rudy Giuliani, the former mayor of New York City and
Republican presidential candidate, suggested in a similar vein that
waterboarding’s legality “depends on how it’s done. It depends on the
circumstances. It depends on who does it.”345 When Senator Kennedy asked
Mukasey directly whether waterboarding is torture, Mukasey replied that were
it “done to [him],” he “would feel that it was,”346 but he refused to classify it
legally as torture and therefore as categorically prohibited under extant law.
Other high-level officials have similarly defended, frequently on
utilitarian grounds, techniques they refer to euphemistically as measures of
“enhanced” interrogation. Vice President Richard Cheney said that CIA
interrogation abroad is “a tougher program, for tougher customers,” which
“has uncovered a wealth of information that has foiled attacks against the
United States.”347 Justice Antonin Scalia argued that an imminent threat could
justify “smacking someone in the face” and suggested that this position puts
one on a slippery slope to torture.348 These and comparable views contrast
starkly with past U.S. treatment of torture generally and waterboarding in
particular, which the United States had formerly not only characterized clearly
as torture but also prosecuted as a capital crime. 349 As of this writing,
Congress’s effort to limit CIA interrogation techniques to those listed in the
Army Field Manual, which explicitly prohibits waterboarding, have met with
repeated opposition from the executive branch.350
It would be a needless digression to revisit contemporary debates over
the “ticking time-bomb” scenario, about which much has been written. 351
343. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General
Michael B. Mukasey at the Justice Department Oversight Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee
(Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2008/ag-testimony-080130.html.
344. Id.
345. Michael Cooper, Giuliani Questioned on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2007, at A20; see
also Michael Cooper & Marc Santora, McCain Rebukes Giuliani on Waterboarding Remark, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007, at A23.
346. Philip Shenon, Mukasey Will Not Rule Out Waterboarding, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2008, at
A26.
347. Richard B. Cheney, Vice President’s Remarks at the Conservative Political Action
Conference (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/02/20080207-11.html.
348. Scalia Says He Sees a Role for Physical Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at
A17.
349. Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468, 472 (2007).
350. Steven Lee Myers, Bush Vetoes Bill on C.I.A. Tactics, Affirming Legacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2008, at A1; see also Michael Cooper, McCain Draws Criticism on Torture Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2008, at A27; Morris Davis, Unforgivable Behavior, Inadmissible Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 2008, § 4, at 12.
351. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 131-63 (2002); David Luban,
Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and
Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005); see also TORTURE:
A COLLECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA (Karen Greenberg ed.,
2006).
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Rather, consider what these debates indicate about the continuing vitality of
the dualistic axiom. In the first place, there can be no real question that
waterboarding is torture under international law. The Convention Against
Torture defines torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity.352

The Convention, which the United States has ratified, further states: “No
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture.” 353 Now, it is nonetheless perfectly
reasonable—and, I believe, also politically desirable and appropriate—to
debate transparently whether the Convention’s absolute prohibition on torture
(and customary law to the same effect) continues to reflect the right policy
given contemporary threats; or whether we should modify the law so that
torture will henceforth be subject to some form of consequentialist analysis.354
But there can be no real legal question that this would be a change to, not a
plausible or bona fide interpretation of, current law. Given the ordinary
meaning of the Convention,355 it is disingenuous to suggest otherwise.
Were torture no longer to be prohibited categorically, but instead
subjected to a consequentialist analysis, it would be emblematic of two recent
trends: on the one hand, the proliferation of IHL rules in the postwar era; on
the other, a countervailing trend to transform IHL rules of an absolute nature
into the kind of flexible, context-dependent constraints represented by
principles of military necessity, proportionality, and distinction.356 In part, this
phenomenon involves a tacit regression to the discredited just war idea that,
contrary to the dualistic axiom, the jus in bello may differ based on the nature
of the conflict or of the enemy—that is, based on ad bellum factors. Yet the
jus ad bellum remains, as it has been historically, oft-politicized, manipulable,
and subject to self-serving interpretations based on the ideological
commitments of the belligerents. Hence, it is said, waterboarding’s legality
depends on “who does it”; 357 or that the manifestly euphemistic “tougher
program” applied by the CIA to detainees abroad is lawful because of
“tougher customers.” 358 Again, a paramount problem with such clear
352. Convention Against Torture, supra note 188, art. 1(1).
353. Id. art. 2(2).
354. Without attempting to defend my views on this issue here, such a change would, in my
judgment, be disastrous, even for the United States’s self-interest narrowly conceived. I substantially
agree with the positions on this issue articulated by David Luban and Jeremy Waldron. See Luban, supra
note 351, at 1440-52; Waldron, supra note 351, at 1682-717.
355. See Vienna Convention, supra note 218, art. 31(1).
356. See Reisman, supra note 186, at 854-55.
357. Cooper, supra note 345. Presidential candidate Fred Thompson expressed similar
sentiments. Michael Cooper & Marc Santora, McCain Rebukes Giuliani on Waterboarding Remark,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007, at A23.
358. Cheney, supra note 347.
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violations of the dualistic axiom—with rendering theoretically uniform in
bello obligations dependent on self-serving ad bellum characterizations—is
that putative changes to international law cannot be limited in practice, even if
they can be in normative ethics, to some belligerents but not others. In short, if
the law against torture depends on who does it, there is no law against torture.
V.

CONCLUSION: THE DUALISTIC AXIOM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Law can control conduct by, among other strategies, prohibition and
regulation. The law of war, including the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello,
uses both strategies. The jus ad bellum tries to minimize resort to force in the
first place by prohibiting it except for self-defense and force authorized by the
Security Council. 359 But contemporary international law recognizes that,
historically, the prohibition strategy has been—at best and charitably—
partially successful. Since the late nineteenth century, the law of war has
therefore focused increasingly on regulation: first, by elaborating flexible in
bello principles of military necessity, proportionality, and discrimination;
second, by dictating that, whatever the utilitarian calculi, some tactics, such as
torture, should be absolutely prohibited; and third, by regulating the scope or
intensity of force by means of customary principles of ad bellum necessity and
proportionality.360
The dualistic axiom is indispensable to the efficacy of the law of war,
such as it may be, because it theoretically ensures that relatively common,
though debatable, ad bellum violations (that is, violations of the prohibition
strategy) do not obviate or diminish the force of the regulatory strategy. As
this Article suggests, however, modernity has witnessed an erosion of the
dualistic axiom. In part, this reflects the practical pressures brought to bear on
the law of war by advances in technology, geopolitical reconfiguration
following the Cold War, and evolution in the nature of war itself. To retain
relevance and potential efficacy, the law must candidly acknowledge and
adapt to these changes, not elide them, as has the ICJ. It must also clarify the
law’s regulatory constraints, especially proportionality, with far more analytic
rigor than it has to date.
I do not mean we should abandon the strategy of prohibition, as some
suggest. I agree with appropriately qualified views that, for all its failings, the
U.N. Charter framework prohibiting war as a general tool of statecraft
359. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
360. The Charter says nothing about necessity and proportionality, but Nicaragua, which
technically purported to construe customary international law on the use of force, held that custom
imposes these ad bellum constraints simultaneously on all uses of armed force, see Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 127 (June 27), and this
position finds substantial support in scholarship. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 13, at 225-26.
Commentators generally trace the requirements of ad bellum necessity and proportionality to the famous
Caroline incident. See id. at 248; see also 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (Sir Robert Jennings
& Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). Yet this position is anachronistic. It grafts modern ideas about
the legality of resort to force that postdate the U.N. Charter onto an incident that took place during the
classical era of international law in which no jus ad bellum existed: states were legally free to use force
(necessary or not, proportionate or not) for any reason. For an account of the Caroline incident, see 2
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 217, at 409-14 (1906); see also R.Y.
Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (1938).
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diminishes the aggregate level of unauthorized coercion.361 But it would be
advisable for international law to focus also, and more deliberately, on
refining the ad bellum and in bello regulatory strategies to meet the new
geostrategic, military, and technological developments in warfare in the
twenty-first century. To conclude, I therefore want to propose four
clarifications or refinements of the dualistic axiom.
A.

Preservation of the Axiom

As the dualistic axiom traditionally insists, ad bellum judgments should
neither obviate nor modify in bello obligations. This means, first, that in bello
constraints of a deontological, absolute nature must not be transformed sub
silentio into contingent norms that may, in circumstances characterized as
supreme emergency or otherwise, be subjected to consequentialist calculi.
That change seems, as argued earlier, to reflect an anachronistic view that
ascribes moral value to states as states, whereas contemporary international
law regards people, not states, as the fundamental unit of value. It would also
introduce into the law self-serving, oft-politicized judgments about the
comparative value of polities. Whatever their truth, judgments of this kind
degrade the jus in bello. Finally, this change could not be limited in practice to
only certain polities. Again, if the international law against torture, for
example, depends on who does it, or on under what circumstances, then, given
how international law operates, there is no law against torture. Those who
would change the absolute nature of certain in bello constraints may therefore
want to consider the long-term, aggregate, and systemic consequences of such
a change. For just as such changes cannot be limited to some polities but not
others, neither can their scope be limited only to exigency. Torture, to stick
with the same (regrettably timely) example, has a documented metastatic
tendency, as the Abu Ghraib scandal illustrates.362 The same goes for other in
bello violations justified by supreme emergency theory.
Conversely, preserving the dualistic axiom requires, second, that in bello
constraints of a flexible, consequentialist nature—those that do call for a
balance between military advantage and civilian harm—be worked out
concretely on a fact-sensitive, case-by-case basis. It would be a grave error, in
law even if not necessarily in normative ethics, to understand “military
advantage” architecturally, that is, as a concept that leads inexorably to one
belligerent’s ultimate casus belli or to victory. If we view military advantage
that way, it becomes difficult to escape the logic of writers like McMahan,
who hold that the dualistic axiom cannot be sustained because the jus ad
bellum inevitably affects, at a minimum, in bello proportionality. That is, in
fact, why Protocol I and other formulations of the in bello proportionality
constraint avoid architectural terms. They instead forbid strikes that would be
excessive, not relative to the casus belli, but “to the concrete and direct

361. E.g., Henkin, supra note 214.
362. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 351, at 1716-17 (citing, inter alia, Henry Shue, Torture, 7
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 143 (1978)); see also Reisman, supra note 186, at 855-56.
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military advantage anticipated.” 363 By articulating a conception of in bello
proportionality at a lower level of abstraction, one tied to the concrete facts on
the ground rather than dependent on abstract perceptions of ultimate justice or
legal right, IHL strives to remove in bello proportionality calculi from oftpoliticized ad bellum judgments.364
To be sure, it is doubtful that belligerents will always, or even often, be
able to divorce these calculi entirely from their views about the legality or
justice of the conflict. But in the first place, that is why the law insists on it;
and second, in point of fact, IHL may be able to realize this aspiration more
often than one might initially think. In conflicts between belligerents of
roughly equal power, traditional enforcement dynamics like reciprocity
encourage IHL compliance. In contrast, in conflicts where one party enjoys an
overwhelming military advantage, such as the 1991 Gulf War or the Kosovo
conflict, that party can often afford, so to speak, to adhere to IHL strictly—
and it will have both reputational and humanitarian incentives to do so.
Technology may also enable the stronger party to avoid significant (or
perhaps, as in Kosovo, any) risk to its combatants, although the in bello
lawfulness of this strategy is questionable.
Third, preserving the dualistic axiom requires that we recognize and
confront candidly a new form of asymmetrical warfare: where one party is an
elusive nonstate belligerent like al-Qaeda or a cognate “network of
networks.” 365 Its goals may be unclear, or simply incompatible with
nonnegotiable international human rights standards.366 In this context, superior
technology and military force in conventional terms will not offer the same
advantages—and, incidentally, the same incentives to abide strictly by the jus
in bello—as exist in the conflicts described above. It is here, as we have
witnessed in the struggle against al-Qaeda and other manifestations of sacred
terrorism,367 that the temptation to violate the dualistic axiom (justified, often,
by the allegedly novel nature of the enemy or the conflict) becomes strong.368
The problem is that, once initiated, putative changes to the law cannot,
realistically, be micromanaged, for example, by seeking to characterize the
changes as applicable to some belligerents but not others. In reality, they
spread rapidly, permeate the international legal process and the perspectives
of its participants at many levels, and broadly influence the conduct of
hostilities. Proposed modifications to the law of war should therefore ideally

363. Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 57(2)(a)(iii) (emphasis added); see also HCJ 769/02 Pub.
Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, Judgment, Dec. 11, 2005, para. 46, available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/570/079/A14/04079570.a14.pdf (stressing that military advantage
must not be speculative but rather direct and anticipated).
364. See Hurka, supra note 14, at 35.
365. See Sloane, supra note 10, at 473-78.
366. Id. at 467-73.
367. While I would not exclude strategically precise and careful uses of the military instrument
in this struggle, “[‘Global War on Terror’] and similar phrases tend, in my judgment, to be imprecise,
unhelpful, and often counterproductive from both a legal and a political perspective.” Id. at 447 n.21.
368. See, e.g., Sassòli, supra note 11, at 258 (quoting William Bradford, Barbarians at the
Gates: A Post-September 11th Proposal To Rationalize the Laws of War, 73 MISS. L.J. 639, 680 (2004));
id. at 247, 261-62; Weiner, supra note 21, at 244.
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be the product of a multilateral, transparent deliberative process rather than of
unilateral, opaque decisions.369
Fourth, exigencies that are perceived, at least, as supreme emergencies
will inevitably arise. It would be unrealistic to think that political elites
charged with the responsibility for protecting their constituents will always
obey the law of war. But that does not necessarily counsel changing the law.
Law is one normative system; it is not everything. Sometimes it will—and
perhaps should—be disobeyed in the service of the values and policies that
inform its content.370 But in a liberal democratic polity governed by the rule of
law, elites who arrogate to themselves the power to act extralegally must, at a
minimum, do so transparently, subjecting themselves to “after-the-fact
political scrutiny.”371 Political exigency itself cannot be grounds to override
the law of war, lest it cease to exert even minimal influence on the conduct of
hostilities that all but the most cynical of critics will generally admit, let alone
to offer guidance to elites operating in good faith under favorable
circumstances for rigorous application of the law.
B.

Concurrent Application of Ad Bellum and In Bello Proportionality

Ad bellum law, including that of self-defense, operates principally at the
level of polities. What value, if any, should the collective nature of polities
receive in the determination of ad bellum proportionality? Despite profound
postwar changes to international law, states continue to enjoy belligerent
rights that are denied to other collectives. A conventional rationale for this is
that states possess an associative value beyond the aggregative value
constituted by the sum of their constituents’ interests.372 But this associative
value normatively depends on the nature of the state, on its political and legal
system, and on the extent to which its constituents constitute a genuine polity.
And at any rate, it must be a distinct question whether normative judgments
about this value should bear on the law of war applicable to different polities.
Historically, each belligerent—and today, that includes not only states
but terrorist networks, criminal syndicates, insurgent groups, and so on—
claims the mantle of justice or self-defense for itself and denies it to the other.
Mindful of this fact, it is clear that drawing normative distinctions between
belligerents will badly disserve the values and policies that today underwrite
the law of war: minimizing unauthorized coercion in the first place and
reducing needless suffering and human rights violations in war. Because
polities will predictably continue to make politicized ad bellum judgments,
both components of proportionality should be kept distinct and applied
concurrently.

369. See Sloane, supra note 10, at 478-84.
370. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 81 (2007); cf. RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 206-22 (1977).
371. GOLDSMITH, supra note 370, at 80-81.
372. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 34, at 147-49. For a defense of this conception of the nationstate, see WALZER, supra note 1, at 54. For an enlightening exchange on it, see Luban, Just War and
Human Rights, supra note 35; Luban, Romance of the Nation-State, supra note 35; Walzer, supra note
34.
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Consequently, just as the dualistic axiom insists that the jus in bello
applies equally to all parties, so too should it be understood to insist that ad
bellum proportionality, the principal regulatory component of the modern jus
ad bellum, applies uniformly, “without any adverse distinction based on the
nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or
attributed to the Parties to the conflict.” 373 The ICJ’s jurisprudence has ill
served postwar international law in this regard. Because force often proves
insusceptible to prohibition, the law should focus equal or more attention on
regulation. Rather than content itself with condemning states for ad bellum
violations of the Charter under Nicaragua’s often anachronistic and
incongruous framework, the Court, and other jurisgenerative institutions,
should develop a more coherent and detailed conception of ad bellum
proportionality. Insistence on the regulation of (allegedly) defensive force by
the ad bellum proportionality constraint will be more likely to influence a
state’s conduct than a categorical, black-or-white pronouncement that its
resort to force violates the Charter.
C.

Exceptions to the Axiom?

The Kosovo conflict raises the question whether international law should
ever countenance limited exceptions to, or modest relaxation of, the dualistic
axiom. Suppose that a zero-casualty military campaign taking advantage of
modern military technology is the sole politically feasible and practicable way
to stop genocide or comparably serious human rights atrocities. Suppose
further some state, or coalition of states, were able and willing to undertake
that campaign provided it sustained essentially no casualties—but not
otherwise. If that campaign, strictly speaking, would violate the jus in bello,
should it ever, nonetheless, be authorized? On the one hand, it may be the
only way to terminate an unconscionable crisis of the sort represented by the
Rwandan genocide of 1994. On the other, it is inevitable that numerous
innocent civilians will die, lose their homes, and suffer horrible injuries
because, metaphorically speaking, technology, despite its tremendous
advances, has yet to create a smart enough bomb.
This scenario poses a stark conflict of theoretically harmonious values.
IHL, including the dualistic axiom, seeks to limit superfluous suffering and to
protect human rights in war. International human rights law—including the
jus cogens prohibition on genocide and the solemn, but tragically hypocritical,
“never again” proclamations that postdate every genocide—counsel prompt
intervention to halt atrocities on this scale. The goals of a humanized IHL may
at times prove to be in at least modest tension with international human rights
imperatives. Contrary to the dualistic axiom, it may be that in certain cases (in
particular, where intervention in arguable violation of the dualistic axiom is
the sole way to stop serious human rights atrocities), the same values that
underwrite that axiom should countenance limited exceptions to it.374 I stress
“may” because the answer will almost certainly depend on fact-sensitive and
373. Protocol I, supra note 30, pmbl.
374. See Hurka, supra note 14, at 52-53.
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value-intensive judgments that it would be imprudent to resolve in the
abstract. Here, I only want to observe the potential tension between, on the
one hand, a traditional axiom of IHL, which on the whole this paper has
defended, and on the other, jus cogens norms to which international law is
equally committed.
Another form of (at least arguable) violation of the axiom that has been
evident recently poses a comparable, though perhaps less stark, tension:
should a belligerent’s casus belli ever be germane to what commentators
increasingly refer to as the jus post bellum, i.e., the law governing, not only
belligerent occupation, but at times, the transformation and reconstruction of a
state after war? Traditionally, the law of war insisted that belligerents
occupying another state, regardless of their casus belli, leave its laws and
institutions untouched to the greatest extent compatible with military
necessity, strictly defined. Recent nation-building exercises in Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq, among other places, challenge this view. The emerging
idea of transformative occupation, whatever its other merits, may well be in
tension with the dualistic axiom.375 Perhaps international law should authorize
and even encourage this phenomenon in some circumstances anyway. Again, I
raise the question to highlight a normative tension that the dualistic axiom
may create in contemporary international law, not to suggest a categorical
answer.
D.

Clarifying Ad Bellum and In Bello Proportionality

International law must clarify, and insist on the strict implementation of,
the distinction between ad bellum and in bello proportionality. Failure to do so
is a characteristic mistake made by, for example, critics of the Thirty-Four
Day War.376 This mistake in part reflects international law’s failure to explain
proportionality except in terms so abstract as to border on the tautological.377
Exploring proportionality in depth would require a separate paper. But I want
to note here a few distinctions between ad bellum and in bello proportionality
in an effort to clarify the proper application of each.
Ad bellum proportionality seeks to limit the quantum of force used in
any resort to force. On one side of the scale, so to speak, is the casus belli,
typically, an assertion of self-defense. But on the other, the relevant concept is
not, as it would be for in bello proportionality, “collateral damage.” Ad bellum
proportionality is instead parasitic on ad bellum necessity. It is the imperative
to use, to quote Webster’s famous statement in the Caroline incident, no more
force that necessary under the circumstances: “the act, justified by the
necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly

375. See Rotem Giladi, The Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello Distinction and the Law of
Occupation, 41 ISR. L. REV. 246 (2008). On transformative or “reformist” occupation, see, for example,
GREGORY H. FOX, HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION 45-58 (2008); Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq,
36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195 (2005); and David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 842
(2003). See also JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 85-133 (2006).
376. See, e.g., Mind Those Proportions, ECONOMIST, July 29, 2006, at 43-44.
377. See, e.g., GARDAM, supra note 27, at 24-25.
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within it.” 378 An act is ad bellum disproportionate if the same ad bellum
objective sought by force clearly could have been achieved by diplomacy or
another nonviolent strategy at a roughly comparable, or even moderately
greater, cost.379
One plausible reading of Caroline, which the ICJ has adopted, is the
“atomized” view: that defensive force must be limited to what is immediately
necessary to respond to the direct source of an attack. Ad bellum
proportionality, in this view, means that “the intensity of self-defense must be
about the same as the intensity defended against.” 380 This parsimonious,
almost lex talionis, position leads to absurd results and does not conform to
state practice. In Oil Platforms, for example, it meant that once the attack on
the Sea Isle City ended, so too did any necessity for self-defense. Any
subsequent response would perforce be needless and disproportionate were it
directed against an Iranian target other than the source of the Iranian missile.
No state, in practice, would accept this conception of ad bellum
proportionality if faced with repeated assaults from another state’s territory,
notwithstanding Nicaragua and its progeny.
The principal alternative conception of ad bellum proportionality is the
“aggregative” view: self-defense must be ad bellum proportionate to the
aggregate attacks on a state rather than to the specific, atomized attack that
ultimately instigated defensive force. Ad bellum proportionality, in this view,
means that “force, even if it is more intensive than [the casus belli] is
permissible so long as it is not designed to do anything more than protect the
territorial integrity or other vital interests of the defending party.” 381 The
italicized phrase, plainly, invites abuses, but the aggregative view is much
more realistic than the atomized view. Hence, when the United States
responded to 9/11 by not only targeting al-Qaeda training camps, but by
invading Afghanistan and ousting the Taliban, few condemned it even though
it had violated ad bellum proportionality as elaborated by the ICJ. In part, this
may be because of the unprecedented scale of the attack on U.S. soil. But it is
also because the aggregative view reflects a more accurate conception of ad
bellum proportionality, which is better suited to modern warfare and more
likely to be accepted by states.
The U.S. invasion may be deemed ad bellum proportionate because it
responded, not to a single attack, but to a series of attacks by al-Qaeda,
including the 1998 embassy bombings and the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S.
Cole, and because the Taliban offered al-Qaeda a friendly host state. Israel’s
decision to attack Hezbollah in 2006 likewise reflected the aggregative view
378. Jennings, supra note 360, at 89 (quoting Daniel Webster’s correspondence with Great
Britain).
379. Webster wrote that “[i]t must be shown,” among other things, “that admonition or
remonstrance to the persons on board the Caroline,” which British forces destroyed, “would have been
unavailing.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hurka, supra note 14, at 37-39.
380. Frederic L. Kirgis, Some Proportionality Issues Raised by Israel’s Use of Armed Force in
Lebanon, ASIL INSIGHTS, Aug. 17, 2006, http://www.asil.org/insights060817.cfm.
381. Id. (emphasis added). The limitation to “vital interests” is indispensable. It would be
untenable to count, among the relevant goods on the ad bellum scale, the fact that, for example, fighting
a war would lift a state’s economy “and the world’s economies out of [a] recession, as World War II
ended the depression of the 1930s,” or that war “may boost scientific research and thereby speed the
development of technologies such as nuclear power.” Hurka, supra note 14, at 40.
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of ad bellum proportionality. After all, the immediate impetus for Israel’s
resort to force did not justify the scale of its attack. The question, however, is
whether Hezbollah’s attacks, in the aggregate and over time, did. 382 That
Israel’s initial resort to force, in this view, may be deemed ad bellum
proportionate does not, of course, imply that Israel made either a prudent or an
advisable decision. But on the aggregative view of ad bellum proportionality,
it made a lawful one relative to Hezbollah.
Given the nature of modern warfare, the aggregative view of ad bellum
proportionality is inevitable. In increasingly common scenarios of
asymmetrical power, nonstate belligerents will characteristically use force
intermittently. This means, typically, a series of discrete strikes, no one of
which, considered in isolation, will suffice as an “armed attack” under
Nicaragua. But small-scale, irregular attacks, even cross-border incursions, of
this kind have become more the rule than the exception today. The legal
question can no longer be, as Nicaragua said, whether a small-scale armed
incursion transgresses the line between “frontier incident” and “armed attack”;
only the latter authorizes self-defense. 383 States, animated by, among other
forces, domestic political pressures, will at some point decide that, in the
aggregate, a series of discrete, comparatively trivial attacks by nonstate actors
operating from the territory of a host or failed state justifies self-defense. The
ICJ’s contrary insistence on the parsimonious, atomized view of ad bellum
proportionality simply encourages states to disregard it and, in some cases,
eviscerates it as an independent regulatory constraint on force. It also
unjustifiably condemns as unlawful many perfectly reasonable and
appropriate uses of defensive force.
In contrast to ad bellum proportionality, which often involves a partially
subjective judgment about one side’s casus belli, its in bello analogue strives
to be agnostic and objective relative to the asserted casus belli. Each discrete
application of force must be proportional in that it not inflict harm that is
excessive relative to the concrete military advantage sought in particular
instances.384 The goal to which that military advantage contributes should not
matter. In bello proportionality does not involve balancing a range of in bello
harms (civilian death, injury, property destruction) against ultimate ad bellum
rationales for resort to armed force (self-defense, humanitarian intervention,
territorial conquest). It rather specifies a concrete conception of military
necessity that is tied closely to operational judgments made by military
strategists based on the particular facts on the ground.
382. Hurka, in the just war context, draws a critical distinction in this regard between
“sufficient” and “contributing” just causes that applies equally to law. Some “goods,” such as deterring
an enemy, may not be sufficient to authorize the initial resort to armed force. Yet once a state responds
in self-defense, those goods may legitimately be counted as aims of defensive force. Hurka, supra note
14, at 41. In Oil Platforms, for example, it would have been unlawful for the United States to attack
Iran’s offshore oil platforms to deter Iranian attacks on neutral vessels preemptively. But once the Sea
Isle City had been struck by a missile and the Samuel B. Roberts mined by Iran, it became legitimate for
the United States to consider, as a matter of ad bellum proportionality, that attacks on the offshore oil
platforms would deter comparable attacks threatening vital U.S. interests in the future.
383. Greenwood, supra note 222, at 381.
384. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 51(5)(b); cf. Rome Statute, supra note 152, art.
8(2)(a)(iv).
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So for in bello proportionality, the answer to the question “proportional
to what?” is not, as it is for ad bellum proportionality, the military necessity or
the casus belli. It is the “incidental loss to civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,” and the question is
whether those harms “would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.”385 The details of this principle, too, urgently
need to be worked out more concretely than they have been to date.386 The
Prosecutor’s Report on Kosovo incisively observes that in bello
proportionality requires answers to, among other perplexing questions, the
following:
a) What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage gained and the
injury to non-combatants or the damage to civilian objects?
b) What do you include or exclude in totaling your sums?
c) What is the standard of measurement in time or space? and
d) To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his own forces to danger
in order to limit civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects?387

The problem is not that international law provides the wrong answers to these
questions; it is that often it provides no answer or only a very abstract one.
Given the emerging geopolitical, strategic, and technological trends of twentyfirst-century conflicts, whether the dualistic axiom can be preserved today
depends in part on whether in bello proportionality can be operationalized in
detail and coherently without reference to ad bellum goals.
*

*

*

*

The ICJ’s pathological dispositif in Nuclear Weapons is emblematic of
the true cost of conflation: it degrades the efficacy and normative force of
both ad bellum and in bello law. It leads to a failure to apply them properly, or
at all, and therefore encourages a more violent world public order,
characterized by more needless suffering and human rights violations than
would be the case were each component of the law of war applied rigorously.
The Nuclear Weapons opinion also shows why the postwar, humanized law of
war tries, at least, not to confuse the interests and values of abstractions, like
states, with those of concrete human beings. The dualistic axiom will
doubtless come under pressure in the twenty-first century, as it has already.
But it remains indispensable to IHL based on our historical experience with
the political and moral reality of war. The law of war must strive, even while
recognizing and confronting modern challenges candidly, to preserve the
axiom and maintain a rigorous analytic distinction between the legality of,
respectively, the initiation and conduct of hostilities—even if, inevitably, it
385. Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 57(2)(a)(iii) (emphasis added); see also HCJ 796/02 Pub.
Comm. Against Torture v. Gov’t of Israel, [2006] ¶ 46 (stressing that military advantage must not be
speculative but rather direct and anticipated).
386. Fenwick, supra note 153, at 545-46.
387. ICTY REPORT, supra note 294, at 1271 (2000); see also MICHAEL WALZER, Two Kinds of
Military Responsibility, in ARGUING ABOUT WAR, supra note 18, at 23; Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany,
A Development of Modest Proportions: The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in the
Targeted Killings Case, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 310, 316 (2007); Hurka, supra note 14.
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does not always realize its aspiration. For the dualistic axiom can rightly be
hailed as one of the paramount achievements of the postwar law of war.

